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LAW’S ENTERPRISE:  
ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES & LEGAL ANALOGY 
Brian N. Larson* 
ABSTRACT 
Reasoning by legal analogy has been described as mystical, reframed 
by skeptics using the deductive syllogism, and called “no kind of 
reasoning at all” by Judge Posner. Arguments by legal analogy happen 
every day in courtrooms, law offices, and law school classrooms, and they 
are the essence of what we mean when we talk of thinking like a lawyer. 
But we have no productive and normative theory for creating and 
evaluating them. Entries in the debate over the last twenty-five years by 
Professors Sunstein, Schauer, Brewer, Weinreb, and others leave us at an 
impasse: the “skeptics” are too focused on the rational force offered by 
the deductive syllogism when they should attend to the kinds of arguments 
that can provide premises for deduction—exactly the work that legal 
analogy accomplishes. Meanwhile, the “mystics” expect us to accept 
legal analogy without an account of how to discipline it. Using the 
argumentation schemes and critical questions of informal logic, this 
article constructs a theory grounded in philosophy, but kitted out for 
action. The theory is not skeptic or mystic, but dynamic. 
  
 
* J.D., Ph.D. Associate Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. For their valuable 
comments on earlier drafts of this essay and related work, I would like to thank Dr. Randy Gordon, 
Professors Francis J. Mootz III, Jeffrey Lipshaw, Wayne Barnes, and Lloyd Weinreb, and participants at 
Texas A&M University School of Law’s internal workshop, the 2018 conference of the Central States 
Law Schools Association, and the 2018 West Coast Rhetoric scholarship workshop at UNLV. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers make arguments before judges using legal analogies every 
day. A lawyer claims the judge should grant his or her client’s motion 
because this case is like earlier cases where courts granted the same type 
of motion and unlike earlier cases where courts denied such a motion. 
Law students invest considerable effort during their first year learning this 
form of argument. They learn it not just in their legal theory, analysis, and 
writing courses, but also in their common-law courses such as torts and 
contracts, and especially in courses where professors engage in Socratic 
dialogue. This kind of reasoning occurs in other fields,1 but it has a 
“special prominence” in the law.2 Indeed, arguing by legal analogy may 
 
 1. Grant Lamond, Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2016), § 1, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/legal-reas-prec/ (last visited May 19, 2018). 
 2. Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal 
Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 925, 926 (1996). 
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be what we mean when we say “thinking like a lawyer.”3  
We may live in law’s empire, a realm that highly values rational 
consistency and logically determinate, correct answers about the law, in 
which “propositions of law [are] taken to be sound or true.”4 Nevertheless, 
on a day-to-day basis, the work we do consists of legal analogy and 
related categories of argumentation, dialogic activities where conceptions 
of soundness and truth compete—what I call “law’s enterprise.” And so, 
law professors tell their students that they need to think logically, but 
arguments from analogy are not logically valid; that is, they cannot 
achieve the highest degree of rational force, where the truth of the 
premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion.5 There is a sense in which 
every law student and lawyer knows this, and the problem has not escaped 
the attention of jurisprudes and other philosophers of law.6 Two stances 
toward the problem purportedly predominate: on the one hand are the 
skeptics (as Harvard Professor Scott Brewer calls them),7 who doubt the 
rational force of legal analogy, though some of them attempt to clean it 
up by converting it to a form of rule-based argumentation. They deny the 
existence of legal analogy or acknowledge it and attempt to convert it to 
deduction. On the other hand are the mystics (Brewer’s term again),8 who 
say legal analogy is a special kind of reasoning, with its own way of 
working, but they do not explain how to discipline it—how to produce 
and evaluate it according to some set of normative standards. They 
essentially ask us to trust them, or at least to trust legal analogy. 
But trust is in short supply among lawyers, especially when evaluating 
the argumentation of opposing counsel. Legal scholars, judges, and 
lawyers want means for assessing, critiquing, and possibly attacking such 
 
 3. See Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Analogy, Expertise, and Experience, 84 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 249, 261 (2017). See also Lloyd L. Weinreb, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN 
LEGAL ARGUMENT ix (2d ed. 2016) (“[T]he use of analogy is at the very center of legal reasoning, so 
much so that it is regarded as an identifying characteristic not only of legal reasoning itself but also of 
legal education.”); Richard A. Posner, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 86–87 (1990) [hereinafter 
Posner, PROBLEMS] (Legal “analogy is the principal candidate for a method that will set lawyers apart 
from everyday reasoners.”). 
 4. Ronald Dworkin, LAW’S EMPIRE 110 (1986). 
 5. See infra Part I(C). 
 6. See infra Part I(C). 
 7. Brewer, supra note 2, at 953. See generally infra Part I(C). Among texts discussed there that 
are at least arguably those of skeptics are Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 571 n.2 
(1987) [hereinafter Schauer, Precedent]; Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3; Larry Alexander, Bad 
Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 57, 57 (1996); Frederick Schauer, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW 
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (2009) [hereinafter Schauer, THINKING]. 
 8. Brewer, supra note 2, at 952. Schauer and Spellman prefer the terms “celebrants,” supra note 
3, at 250 and “defenders,” id. at 266. See generally infra Part I(C). Among texts discussed there that are 
at least arguably those of defenders are Cass Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 
(1993) and Weinreb, supra note 3. Brewer classes himself as neither skeptic nor mystic, but I contend that 
he aligns most closely with the skeptics. 
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argumentation. Lawyers want these means when evaluating judges’ 
opinions and deciding whether to appeal. They may also want them as 
tools for creating stronger arguments of their own. In short, they want a 
theory of legal argument that is not skeptical or mystical but dynamic.9 
This article provides a theoretical framework for legal analogy that is 
both normative and productive.10 In other words, this framework equips 
legal scholars, judges, and lawyers with tools to reconstruct (where 
necessary) and rationally criticize the legal analogies of others. It also 
provides this group with tools to construct strong arguments and 
counterarguments of their own from legal analogy. It makes a case for 
using dialogical argumentation schemes11 as models for constructing and 
assessing legal arguments, and particularly legal analogies. Finally, it 
provides a more detailed explanation of the process of identifying or 
reconstructing relevant similarities and dissimilarities between cases than 
is currently available in existing literature.12  
Argumentation schemes do not make legal analogies deductively 
valid—nothing can do that. Nevertheless, though argumentation schemes 
do not deliver that level of rational force, they do provide the means to 
assess legal analogies, to subject them to rational critique that can lead to 
more-or-less confident assertions about their quality as legal 
argumentation. And that, too, is a central part of law’s enterprise. 
Part I describes the course legal scholarship regarding legal analogy 
has taken so far, after clarifying what this article means by 
“argument(ation)” and “legal analogy.” It then shows that logical 
deduction, the gold standard for rational force and legal argumentation 
and the darling of the skeptics, can do only a small part of the hard work 
of the legal analyst and the proponent of legal arguments. Nevertheless, 
skeptical scholars generally try to convert legal analogy into a deductive 
type of argument to shore up its rational force—the strength of an 
argument’s form. In so doing, however, scholars focus too closely on the 
logical form of an argument and not enough on the complexity of the 
premises. Part I also shows that induction, as philosophers understand the 
term, has very little to do with law at all. What we are left with is non-
inductive analogy—an unruly type of argument—and an impasse or 
aporia.  
 
 9. Dynamic, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (March 2018), 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/58818, last visited May 20, 2018 (“Of or pertaining to force in action or 
operation; active.”). The word comes from Greek δυναμικός meaning “powerful,” and from δύναμις 
meaning “power, strength.” Id. 
 10. Whether this theory is empirically descriptive is a matter for future study. See infra Part III(D) 
and note 256; Schauer & Spellman, supra note 3, at 268.  
 11. See infra Part II(B). See generally Douglas Walton, Chris Reed & Fabrizio Macagno, 
ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES (2008). 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 204–217. 
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Part II proposes a new tack, introducing informal logic and dialogical 
argumentation schemes to achieve practical rationality in natural-
language arguments, like those we see in the law. Informal logic and 
argumentation theories do not abandon deduction, but rather they 
acknowledge that the premises for deductions must themselves be the 
product of argumentation, and that those foundational arguments usually 
are not deductive. Rather, argumentation theory calls on arguments’ 
proponents and opponents to be rational people arguing reasonably in “a 
critical dialogue known as philosophical ‘dialectics.’”13 One way they can 
do so is by employing argumentation schemes, presumptively acceptable 
argument forms that can be defeated with the use of critical questions. 
Part II shows how, in the law, even valid deductive argument forms are 
defeasible. 
Part III pursues this new course, describing and applying the legal 
analogy and legal (dis)analogy argumentation schemes. This part also 
extensively considers the challenge of identifying relevant similarities 
and dissimilarities—a problem of great theoretical and practical concern. 
Finally, this section offers an extended analysis of the briefs leading to an 
opinion in a real case. 
After the article provides a solid foundation for future research into 
argumentation schemes generally, and legal analogy and (dis)analogy 
argumentation schemes specifically, the conclusion will look to future 
work to broaden and deepen these efforts. It will claim that the study of 
legal argumentation and argumentation schemes should be dialogical—
just like argumentation schemes themselves. Thus, empirical work may 
warrant changes to the argumentation schemes presented here; and the 
principles of reasonableness and rationality undergirding argumentation 
schemes may ultimately provide grounds for changes in how lawyers 
argue. 
I. THE OLD COURSE: ARGUMENT BY LEGAL ANALOGY  
We expect the law to “[t]reat like cases alike.”14 This is an important 
principle in American legal thinking. In theory, it supports fairness and 
predictability: the law should treat similarly situated individuals the 
same,15 and predictability permits those subject to the law to plan their 
activities efficiently in such a way that their expectations are not 
 
 13. Harm Kloosterhuis, Analogy Argumentation in Law: A Dialectical Perspective, 8 ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE & L. 173, 174 (2000). 
 14. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 7, at 595. See Brewer, supra note 2, at 936. 
 15. See Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 42 (noting principles like “equal justice under law, 
equal protection of the laws, equality before the law, one law for rich and poor, and so forth”). 
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frustrated.16 We also expect that legal theory or jurisprudence will provide 
“a body of objective norms . . . or a set of analytic methods . . . that can 
be used to ensure that judicial decisions will be objective, determinate, 
impersonal.”17 Consequently, the law needs a theory to account for 
production and criticism of arguments by legal analogy given their 
widespread use. Nevertheless, “despite its . . . special prominence in legal 
reasoning . . . , it remains the least well understood and explicated form 
of reasoning.”18 This article takes important steps to address this gap by 
providing a theory of legal argument using argumentation schemes and 
by providing an argumentation scheme specifically for legal analogy. 
A. Argumentation 
This article is concerned with argumentation, defined here as a series 
of propositional sentences—called “premises”—arranged in a form that 
supports the truth or acceptability of another propositional sentence, 
called a “conclusion.”19 As used here, “argumentation” includes both the 
premises and conclusion.20 Based on this definition, any written or spoken 
legal analysis—whether it appears in a memorandum analyzing some 
aspect of the law, a lawyer’s brief written to persuade to a court, or a 
court’s opinion written to justify or explain a decision—contains 
argumentation.21  
This article is not particularly about legal reasoning, defined here as a 
“mental activity of marshaling one’s premises, detecting logical 
 
 16. This view is not without shortcomings. Predictability may to some extent justify the use of 
precedent and legal analogy, but we are still confronted with the question: “To what extent is a 
decisionmaking environment willing to tolerate suboptimal results [i.e., bad precedents] in order that 
people may plan their lives according to decisions previously made?” Schauer, Precedent, supra note 7, 
at 597. 
 17. Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 7. 
 18. Brewer, supra note 2, at 926. Not everyone agrees that legal analogy actually exists, or if it 
does, that it is good to have around. See Alexander, supra note 7, at 57. 
 19. Cf. Leo Groarke, Informal Logic, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, § 2 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2017), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/logic-informal/ 
(last visited May 21, 2018) (claiming argumentation is “an attempt to provide evidence in favour of some 
point of view,” consisting of “collections of premises and conclusions.”). 
 20. See J. Anthony Blair, Relevance, Acceptability and Sufficiency Today, GROUNDWORK IN THE 
THEORY OF ARGUMENTATION: SELECTED PAPERS OF J. ANTHONY BLAIR 87 (2012) [hereinafter Blair, 
RAS Today] (An argument is “a claim and a reason or reasons that support it.”); Trudy Govier, THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF ARGUMENT 45 (1999) [hereinafter Govier, PHILOSOPHY] (“[A]n argument is minimally 
composed of premises (one or more) and a conclusion.”); Trudy Govier, A PRACTICAL STUDY OF 
ARGUMENT 1 (7th ed., 2014) [hereinafter Govier, STUDY] (same). 
 21. Professor Schauer might disagree, as he distinguishes the argument of lawyers from the 
justification of judges, which, though they share a logical structure, he says are “separate events within a 
larger rhetorical setting.” Schauer, Precedent, supra note 7, at 571 n.2. As we are interested in the 
schematic, if not logical, structure of all such events, the distinction is not productive here. 
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connections, and making inferences.”22 It “is a cognitive process, or 
various kinds of cognitive process.”23 In other words, reasoning is what 
goes on in our heads and argumentation is a presentation in words of 
premises and conclusion.24 The distinction has occasionally hung up 
theorists thinking about legal analogy and other problems of legal 
theory.25 Looking into folks’ heads is considerably more difficult than 
analyzing what they say or write in support of their conclusions. The 
means to do the former are not accessible to most legal scholars and 
practitioners.  
Nevertheless, some entries in the literature exploring legal analogy 
focus on the cognition that underlies or typifies it. For example, 
Professors Schauer and Spellman discuss whether experience and 
expertise in the law permit lawyers and judges to reason analogically in 
the ways particularly relevant to law, but they do not explain how lawyers 
and judges argue for their conclusions.26 They note that scientific research 
suggests reasoners jump from particular to particular without the need for 
explanatory rules.27 For them, “[w]hat makes analogical reasoning 
distinctive is that although people who draw analogies see similarities that 
are necessarily based on principles or theories, these principles or theories 
are often so embedded in their thought processes that they are not 
consciously perceived.”28 Professor Weinreb offers a full-throated 
defense of analogical reasoning, principally on cognitive grounds.29 
Professor Berger also explores the cognitive nature of thinking by and 
about analogies, focusing on the role of intuitive (System 1) thinking with 
and about them rather than reflective (System 2), or rational, thinking.30 
 
 22. Stephen F. Barker, ELEMENTS OF LOGIC 269 n.2 (6th ed. 2003) (emphasis added). 
 23. J. Anthony Blair, The “Logic” of Informal Logic, GROUNDWORK IN THE THEORY OF 
ARGUMENTATION: SELECTED PAPERS OF J. ANTHONY BLAIR 101, 102 (2012). 
 24. Barker, supra note 22, at 5. This distinction in terminology might not be acceptable to all 
scholars. E.g., Robert Alexy, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION 14 (Ruth Adler & Neil MacCormick 
trans., 1989) (“Legal reasoning will be understood here as a linguistic activity.”). And the OED offers 
“argue” as a synonym of the verb “reason.” Reason, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (March 
2018), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/159070, (last visited May 21, 2018). 
 25. Consider Judge Posner’s critique of Professor Weinreb: “Weinreb has confused how judges 
think with how they talk [or write].” Richard A. Posner, Reasoning by Analogy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 
765 (2005-2006) [hereinafter Posner, Reasoning] (reviewing Lloyd L. Weinreb, LEGAL REASON: THE 
USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT (1st ed. 2005)).  
 26. See generally Schauer & Spellman, supra note 3. 
 27. Schauer & Spellman, supra note 3, at 266 (citing Adam E. Green, et al, Neural Correlates of 
Creativity in Analogical Reasoning, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: LEARNING, MEMORY & 
COGNITION 264, 269–71 (2012); Adam E. Green, et al, Connecting Long Distance: Semantic Distance in 
Analogical Reasoning Modulates Frontopolar Cortex Activity, 20 CEREBRAL CORTEX 70, 73 (2010)). 
 28. Schauer & Spellman, supra note 3, at 266. 
 29. See Weinreb, supra note 3, at 114–22. 
 30. See generally Linda L. Berger, Metaphor and Analogy: The Sun and Moon of Legal 
Persuasion, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 147 (2013). For discussion of the System 1–System 2 distinction popularized 
7
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Professor Brewer discusses the role of abduction in legal analogy. 
Abduction is a process where a “reasoner notices some phenomenon . . . 
that calls for explanation,” then “notices that the existence of some other 
factor or set of factors could explain the given phenomenon,” and settles 
on that explanation “as the tentatively correct explanation of the 
phenomenon.”31 Thus, abduction is sometimes called “inference to the 
best explanation.”32 Though it might be nothing more than an educated 
guess, it is doubtless a useful way of thinking about and solving problems, 
and it may be the principal way in which scientists develop hypotheses 
that they then test experimentally.33 The problem for anyone but the 
reasoner, however, is that abduction calls on “creative insight” from a 
person to resolve a question in a context of doubt.34 It “requires what is 
inevitably an imaginative and somewhat untamed moment of rational 
insight.”35 
To present argumentation is to present in words the reasoning that 
supports a conclusion.36 Though interesting in terms of exploring the 
psychology of legal decision-making, studies like Schauer and 
Spellman’s, Weinreb’s, Berger’s, and Brewer’s do not offer a means for 
someone outside the head of the legal reasoner to assess the quality of the 
reasoning. That is what a good theory of legal argumentation does—or at 
least should do.  
B. Legal Analogy 
This article also discusses legal analogy—the effort of lawyers and 
judges to classify or evaluate operative facts in an instant case, with 
reference to cited cases, to determine whether a particular legal 
consequence should apply—the effort to treat like cases alike. But what 
counts as likeness is a “hard question.”37 At this point, it may be useful to 
 
by Daniel Kahneman, see id. at 159–63. On the use of “rational” in this article, see infra notes 158 and 
166–167. 
 31. Brewer, supra note 2, at 947–48. 
 32. Igor Douven, Abduction, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta 
ed., Summer 2017), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/abduction/ (last visited May 21, 
2018). 
 33. See generally id. 
 34. Brewer, supra note 2, at 979. 
 35. Id. at 1026. 
 36. I apply this stricture for purposes of this article. In other contexts, argumentation might be 
pursued using modes other than the verbal, including the visual, symbolic, and bodily. See, e.g., Kevin 
Michael DeLuca, Unruly Arguments: The Body Rhetoric of Earth First!, Act Up, and Queer Nation, 36 
ARGUMENTATION & ADVOCACY 9 (1999); Assimakis Tseronis, Multimodal Argumentation: Beyond the 
Verbal/Visual Divide, 220 SEMIOTICA 41 (2018). 
 37. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 7, at 596. See also Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 42 (The 
concept of treating like cases alike is “empty without specification of the criteria for ‘likeness,’ and in law 
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consider a hypothetical example. 
Imagine that the legislature in the state of Springer enacted Springer 
Code section 15.15 in 1999: “[a]nyone who operates a vehicle in a 
municipal park is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.”38 The preamble of the 
act (adopted by the legislature but not included in the code compilation) 
included legislative findings that numerous persons had driven their cars 
and pickups onto park lawns, damaging lawns and, in one instance, 
injuring a pedestrian. It cited enhancing safety and preventing damage to 
public property as motivations for the act. The new statute was codified 
within the chapter of Springer’s code relating to parks and recreation. 
During ensuing years, there were many cases in state court against those 
who drove their cars or pickups onto the park. Some defendants appealed, 
but not on grounds that the charge did not involve a vehicle.  
There are, however, two reported cases on the matter. In State v. Cyclist 
(2006), a citizen riding a bicycle in the park “flipped the bird” at a police 
officer, who promptly arrested her for operating a vehicle in the park. She 
pled guilty subject to an appeal on the issue of whether her bicycle was a 
vehicle within the meaning of the statute. The court of appeals reversed 
the conviction, ruling that a “bicycle is not a vehicle,” emphasizing that 
“a bicycle is not motorized.” In its account of the facts of the case, the 
court noted that the bicyclist was wearing a neon yellow-green reflective 
safety vest. A dissenting judge objected that the dictionary definition of 
“vehicle” includes some things that are not motorized.39 In State v. Biker 
(2008), police arrested a person sitting next to a motorcycle on the grass 
of the park. The defendant claimed he had walked, not ridden, the bike to 
bring it in the park. The police officer noted the lawn was heavily 
damaged near the motorcycle. After a trial conviction, the defendant 
appealed, arguing that the motorcycle was not a vehicle.40 The court of 
appeals affirmed in a brief opinion, recounting these facts and noting only 
that “a motorcycle is a vehicle of the kind the legislature sought to exclude 
with the statute.” 
Fast forward to 2019. Imagine a citizen riding a Boosted brand of 
motorized skateboard on a sidewalk in the park collided with a pedestrian. 
 
those criteria are political.”); Brewer, supra note 2, at 936–37 (“[T]he principle is often too vague to 
resolve particular cases.”). 
 38. This example, among a few well known to first-year law students, is of course adapted from 
H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126–27 (2d ed. 1997). Another well-known example is the ordinance 
requiring dogs in the park to be leashed. Kent Greenawalt, LAW & OBJECTIVITY 42–44 (1992). So far as 
I know, no one has empirically studied the propensity of legal philosophers to use regulation of public 
parks as examples. 
 39. See Vehicle(b), OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (March 2018), 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/221903 (last visited May 20, 2018) (“A means of conveyance or 
transport on land, having wheels, runners, or the like; a car, cart, truck, carriage, sledge, etc.”). 
 40. Let us assume he did not appeal on the issue of whether he operated the motorcycle because 
the jury inferred that he had ridden it under power onto the park based on other evidence presented at trial. 
9
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The motor was engaged at the time of the collision, but several bicycles 
nearby were going faster than the boarder. There was no evidence the 
skateboard ever left the sidewalk, and the boarder wore a reflective safety 
vest. An officer on the scene arrested her. The pedestrian did not suffer 
injury and asked the officer not to arrest the boarder. A Kickstarter 
website for Boosted described its board as the “[w]orld’s lightest electric 
vehicle.”41 
Counsel for the defendant in State v. Boostrider is likely to argue for 
acquittal on grounds that the Boosted Board is not a vehicle because the 
facts in Boostrider (motorized skateboard that stays on sidewalks and 
goes slower than bicycles) are more like the facts in State v. Cyclist 
(bicycle) than in State v. Biker (heavier motorized machine). Of course, 
the prosecutor will attempt to draw the comparison rather differently. This 
is the type of argument that I shall refer to as “argument from (or by) legal 
analogy.” 
Use of “analogy” here means that lawyers “compare whatever is at all 
doubtful with something similar concerning which there is no doubt, so 
as to prove the uncertain by the certain.”42 The outcome in Boostrider is 
doubtful, but those in Cyclist and Biker are well documented. When 
deciding whether Boostrider is more like Cyclist or Biker, the court will 
consider the relevant differences and similarities among them. A court 
generally may consider some differences, “such as differences in skill and 
effort,” and generally may not consider others, such as “differences in 
religion, race, social class, income, or relationship to the judge,”43 or the 
color of the hat one of the parties wore.44 
I conjecture that the most frequent use of legal analogy in legal 
arguments is to resolve what Professor Neil MacCormick referred to as 
“problems of classification,” where one considers whether a situation 
comes within the meaning of a rule,45 or “problems of evaluation,” where 
one attempts to apply a legal standard like fair use in copyright.46 One 
 
 41. Boosted Boards—The World's Lightest Electric Vehicle, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/170315130/boosted-boards-the-worlds-lightest-electric-vehicl (last 
visited May 31, 2018). 
 42. Quintilian, ON THE TEACHING OF SPEAKING AND WRITING: TRANSLATIONS FROM BOOKS 
ONE, TWO, AND TEN OF THE INSTITUTIO ORATORIA bk. 1, ch. 6, at 49 (James J. Murphy ed., 1987). 
 43. Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 42. 
 44. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 699, 699 (1998). Of course, 
in the Boostrider case, counsel might try to make something of the reflective safety vest the defendant 
wore. 
 45. Neil MacCormick, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL REASONING 41, 
141 (2005). But see Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton, Argument from Analogy in Law, the Classical 
Tradition, and Recent Theories, 42 PHILOSOPHY & RHETORIC 154, 155 (Legal “analogy is used to apply 
general legal rules to cases not directly falling under the classifications of the rule.”). 
 46. See MacCormick, supra note 45, at 41, 73–75. 
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compares the instant case to cited cases47 to see whether it is appropriate 
to ascribe the legal label—be it “vehicle,” “operate,” or “fair use”—to 
some component of the instant case. For MacCormick, the classification 
or evaluation determines whether operative facts (OF) are present, calling 
for application of some normative consequence (NC).48 
Lawyers and law professors often refer to this process as “analogizing” 
or “disanalogizing.” Properly speaking, in cognitive science, 
argumentation and rhetorical theory, case-based arguments of this kind 
may be more fairly described as “argument from example” or “argument 
from illustration.” Theorists in these fields consider “analogy” to apply to 
a comparison that can “transfer information and procedures from one 
domain to another.”49 The analogy user transfers information from one 
domain, the source, to the other, the target.50 So scientists might use the 
flowing of water in pipes—a source domain that the audience understands 
from direct personal experience—as an analogy for the flow of 
electricity—a target domain of which most have no direct personal 
experience.51 But for these properly to be called “analogies,” the source 
and target come from different domains—like water in pipes and 
electricity in wires.52 In the Boostrider example and others discussed in 
this article, the problems of classification and evaluation will not fit this 
profile.53 It is worth noting here that analogy in legal reasoning has a very 
 
 47. Generally, I will use “cited case” instead of “precedent case” to refer to the source case of legal 
analogies throughout this article, because I recognize that not all cases that might be used as authorities 
in arguments by legal analogy have precedential value for the instant case and may therefore not be 
“precedent cases” in the fullest sense.  
 48. MacCormick, supra note 45, at 24. 
 49. John H. Holland et al., A framework for induction, INDUCTION: PROCESSES OF INFERENCE, 
LEARNING, AND DISCOVERY 1, 4 (1986) (emphasis added). 
 50. Simon Farrell & Stephan Lewandowsky, Computational Models as Aids to Better Reasoning 
in Psychology, 19 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 329, 329 (2010). See also Berger, supra note 
30, at 164. Alternatives to technical terms abound. For example, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca use 
“phoros” (phore) for “source” and “theme” (thème) for “target.” Chaïm Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-
Tyteca, TRAITE DE L’ARGUMENTATION: LA NOUVELLE RHÉTORIQUE 501 (6th ed. 2008). Govier uses 
“analogue” for “source” and “primary subject” for “target.” Govier, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 20, at 139–
40; Govier, STUDY, supra note 20, at 318. In the legal literature, Schauer and Spellman use “source” and 
“target.” Supra note 3, at 253-54. 
 51. Farrell & Lewandowsky, supra note 50, at 329. 
 52. See Farrell & Lewandowsky, supra note 50, at 329; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, supra note 
50, at 502 (“[T]hème et phore doivent appartenir à des domaines différents.”). “Where the two 
relationships one compares come from the same domain and can be subsumed under a common structure, 
reasoning by example or illustration takes place, the [target] and the [source] providing two particular 
cases of the same rule.” Id. at 502 (my translation). Berger, supra note 30, at 165, distinguishes “literal 
similarity or category-like abstraction” from “analogy,” with an example of the former being “The X12 
star system in the Andromeda galaxy is like our solar system” and an example of the latter being “The 
hydrogen atom is like our solar system.” 
 53. There are analogies in the law, as, for example, when a court applies a doctrine from one part 
of the law to another part of the law by analogy. See generally MacCormick, supra note 45, 205–12. 
Brewer, supra note 2, at 941–94, conflates argument from analogy and argument from example. In any 
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different function in statutory interpretation in continental European law, 
where it is used to fill a gap or lacuna in the body of statutes.54 Logicians 
also use “analogy” to refer to certain logical forms, which we will discuss 
below.55 This article uses the term “legal analogy” to distinguish the sense 
of the example given above and discussed below from the senses of 
“analogy” that prevail in other fields.  
The preceding sections make clear what this article means by 
“argument by legal analogy” and why it is important. As the next section 
will show, however, the leading legal theorists who have taken on the 
issue tend to focus their attention on whether legal analogy can live up to 
their own preferences on broader questions in legal philosophy or 
jurisprudence. Though their perspectives function to refine the problem, 
they fail to account for legal analogy and to provide a means for producing 
and evaluating it. 
C. Accounts of Legal Analogy Thus Far 
Accounts of legal analogy in legal scholarship thus far have failed for 
two principal reasons. First, the skeptics reject legal analogy because it 
does not have the rational force of logical deduction. Skeptics either deny 
legal analogy exists, converting it into a deductive form, or they doubt its 
utility. Their perspective fails because deduction cannot do the work that 
legal analogy must do; nevertheless, lawyers use legal analogy every day 
without worrying about the absence of the deductive form. Second, the 
mystics embrace legal analogy as a form of argument distinct from 
deduction, but they fail to provide a framework for creating and assessing 
such arguments. Their perspective leaves legal analogy dangerously 
undisciplined. To make sense of these positions, it is helpful to discuss 
them in the context of a refresher on logical forms. 
It is commonplace in legal education and in observations about 
lawyers’ performances that legal argumentation should be logical. But 
that term is difficult to define. It comes from the Greek word logos, which 
the Greeks used to mean a notoriously large number of things, including 
“word,” “speech,” “argument,” “reason,” etc.56 For some contemporary 
theorists, a logical argument is one that can be reduced to mathematical 
certainty by converting it into formal, symbolic logic, or at least to a 
 
event, the discussion below may ultimately suggest that the distinction between them is less one of kind 
and more one of degree. 
 54. Katja Langenbucher, Argument by Analogy in European Law, 57 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 481, 482–
84 (1998).  
 55. See infra text accompanying notes 137–154. 
 56. See George A. Kennedy, A NEW HISTORY OF CLASSICAL RHETORIC 11–12 (1994). 
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deductive syllogism.57 Others embrace a larger ambit for “logic.” Barker, 
for example, calls it the “critical study of reasoning.”58 For the moment, 
we will use Barker’s definition. 
We must distinguish logical “types” from logical “forms;” here, 
“types” are “the broadly recognized patterns of argument that are known 
under the headings ‘deduction,’ ‘induction,’ ‘abduction,’ and ‘analogy,’” 
and “form” demonstrates the “relation between the truth of an argument’s 
premises and the truth of its conclusion.”59 The rational force of an 
argument’s form is “the degree to which the form . . . yields a reliable 
judgment about the truth of its conclusion based on the assumed truth of 
its premises.”60  
As we will see in subsection (1), a valid deduction provides the greatest 
force: if one accepts the premises as true, the argumentation form compels 
the truth of the conclusion.61 The skeptics embrace the valid deduction as 
the only logical form that can yield good arguments. Subsection (2) 
separately considers the approach of Professor Brewer, who appears to be 
a skeptic, despite denying that he is. Subsection (3) considers inductive 
generalization. Valid induction provides some rational force, though less 
than deduction: the truth of the premises makes the conclusion probable. 
But induction (as we will define it) is of no use in the kinds of arguments 
we are considering here. Subsection (4) considers arguments with the 
most uncertain rational force: analogies.62 Finally, subsection (5) 
recapitulates and identifies the aporia at which we find ourselves. 
1. Deduction and Legal-analogy Skeptics 
The most well understood form of deductive argument is the deductive 
syllogism, which is well known among those in the law and looks 
something like this: 
 
 57. See Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 39 n.3 (“[B]y ‘logic’ I mean deductive and 
mathematical logic, not systematic thinking in general or specialized logics such as inductive logic.”). 
According to Brewer, “‘logic’ was for the [Legal] Realists a (somewhat misleading) metonym for 
‘deduction.’” Brewer, supra note 2, at 931. 
 58. Barker, supra note 22, at 1. Throughout this article, I will cite Barker’s text on logic for 
propositions about logic and for discussion of logical forms. I use it principally because some of the legal 
scholars taking up these issues have cited it, or earlier editions of it. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 8, at 
743 n.7; Brewer, supra note 2, at 944 n.63. I make no claim that Barker’s terminology and definitions are 
standard among logicians, though I have attempted to ensure his usage does not vary widely from his 
peers. 
 59. Brewer, supra note 2, at 942. 
 60. Id. at 928. 
 61. Id. at 943. 
 62. This “analogy,” defined infra in text accompanying notes 137–154, has the meaning given to 
it by the logicians that are sources of the discussion there. 
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VALID DEDUCTIVE FORM (“MODUS PONENS”) 
 Major Premise:  All persons who operate a vehicle in the 
municipal park are guilty of a gross misdemeanor. 
 Minor Premise:  Mr. Biker operated a vehicle in a municipal 
park.63 
 Conclusion:  Mr. Biker is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.64 
 
In the syllogism, there are three propositions: the major and minor 
premises and the conclusion.65 In the deductive form shown here, known 
sometimes as modus ponens,66 the major premise states a general or 
universal rule in the form of antecedent—“all persons who operate a 
vehicle in the municipal park”—and consequent—“guilty of a gross 
misdemeanor;” the minor premise presents an instance of the antecedent; 
and the conclusion applies the consequence to that instance. Thus, the 
syllogism can also be restated in the form of a conditional categorical rule 
and its application, with the rule in our example being: “if x operates a 
vehicle in the municipal park, then x is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.” 
More generally, legal rules can be stated in valid deductive form: 
“[w]henever OF [operative fact(s)] then NC [normative consequence].”67 
In this sense, the deductive syllogism is at play in the application of 
 
 63. When calculating the rational force of this deductive form, we assume the premises are true. 
There was debate in the Biker case about whether his motorcycle was a “vehicle,” and given the facts, 
there might have been debate about a mixed question of law and fact: whether he “operated” it in the park. 
 64. Aristotle described the forms of valid deductions in the Prior Analytics, but his descriptions 
there relate to categorical sentences, such as if we “let A belong to every B and B to some C” then “it is 
necessary for A to belong to some C.” Aristotle, PRIOR ANALYTICS, bk. A, ch. 4, at 5 (Robin Smith tran., 
1989). The example here applies the predicate “is guilty of a gross misdemeanor” to a singular subject, a 
kind of deduction in which Aristotle was less interested, because it could not yield generalizable 
knowledge. Note, too, that the Prior Analytics provides Aristotle’s (and as far as we know, the world’s) 
first comprehensive listing of the various valid forms that a deduction with three “terms” can take. See 
Robin Smith, Appendix I to Aristotle, PRIOR ANALYTICS 229 (Robin Smith tran., 1989) (forms listed in 
assertoric and modal versions). For a discussion of “categorical sentences,” see Barker, supra note 22, ch. 
2. I am grateful to Professor Pannier for the observation, correct I think, that Aristotle did not identify the 
example given here as one of the valid syllogistic forms because of Aristotle’s interest in universally 
quantified sentences—his way to knowledge. I have nevertheless continued the common practice of 
referring to this form as a “syllogism.” For discussion of categorical syllogisms of the type Aristotle 
embraced, see Barker, supra note 22, at 44. 
 65. See Barker, supra note 22, at 44. 
 66. “Modus ponens” is properly a label for a move in sentential logic, rather than syllogistic logic. 
See generally Barker, supra note 22, chs. 2 and 3. I adopt the practice here because it provides a convenient 
and conventional label. 
 67. MacCormick, supra note 45, at 24. Note that I have been, and will continue to be, loose about 
wording of premises, taking no pains to make consistent use of propositional, predicate, or quantified 
terms. The differences, though important in formal logic, are not important here. 
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(almost) any legal rule.68  
In a deductive syllogism, if the premises are true, they compel the 
conclusion; just as in application of a legal rule, if the rule and operative 
fact are correctly and truthfully stated, they compel the conclusion. In 
neither case is any further inquiry needed, and none could change the 
outcome.69  
It is, however, possible to make an argument of the deductive type fail 
if the arguer uses an improper form. Consider this legal example: 
 
INVALID DEDUCTIVE FORM (DENYING THE ANTECEDENT) 
 Major Premise:  If a witness statement is excluded under the dead 
man’s statute, then it is inadmissible to prove a 
claim against a decedent’s estate. 
 Minor Premise:  The dead man’s statute does not exclude the 
statement at issue. 
 Conclusion:  The statement at issue is not inadmissible (i.e., it 
is admissible).70 
 
The author of this argument offers us: (A) “if antecedent, then 
consequent;” (B) “not antecedent;” therefore (C) “not consequent.” The 
argument holds itself out as being of a deductive type, but it has a 
defective form, committing the logical fallacy of denying the 
antecedent.71 The court in a case where a party made this argument 
concluded there were other reasons that a statement might be excluded 
and thus rejected the argument.72 
Deduction is the gold standard of legal reasoning and the end-point that 
proponents of legal arguments wish to reach in them.73 However, the 
reason one cannot rely too heavily on deduction in actual legal 
arguments—the reason deduction is insufficient for legal argument—is 
premises: Aristotle recognized the syllogism only operates on its 
 
 68. See Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 42 (“[M]ost legal questions are resolved 
syllogistically. A legal rule has the form of the major premise of a syllogism.”). 
 69. See id. at 38.  
 70. This example is drawn from Kevin W. Saunders, Informal Fallacies in Legal Argumentation, 
44 S.C.L. REV. 343, 379 (1993) (citing Harry Levitch Jewelers, Inc. v. Jackson, 573 S.W.2d 746 (Tenn. 
1978)). 
 71. See id. at 379. “[D]enying the antecedent involves a misunderstanding of the nature of a 
conditional. The conditional ‘if p, then q’ asserts that when p (the antecedent) is true, q (the consequent) 
is also true;” but “[t]he conditional allows no inference about the truth of q when p is false.” Id. Saunders 
notes that the Levitch court referred to this (technically incorrectly) as a “non sequitur.”  
 72. See Saunders, supra note 70, at 379. 
 73. See MacCormick, supra note 45, at 32; Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 39 (“So 
compelling and familiar is syllogistic reasoning that lawyers and judges, ever desirous of making their 
activity seem as objective as possible, try hard to make legal reasoning seem as syllogistic as possible.”) 
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premises; it cannot provide them.74 In law, this challenge takes (at least) 
two forms: (1) the difficulty of asserting that the major premise is really 
true as stated, that is, that it correctly states the legal rule, and (2) the 
difficulty of applying legal-categorical labels to actual instances. 
Consider both in the context of the Boostrider case.75  
The statute definitively states the major premise or rule in Boostrider: 
“anyone who operates a vehicle in the municipal park is guilty of a gross 
misdemeanor.” However, in a court subject to the Cyclist and Biker cases, 
counsel for the defendant might argue that the rule now contains an 
exception: “anyone who operates a vehicle, except a bicycle or smaller 
vehicle, in the municipal park is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.” Counsel 
for the state might similarly argue that that the rule is now “anyone who 
operates a vehicle, except a non-motorized vehicle, in the municipal park 
is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.” Either of these formulations is 
plausible, given the precedents, but clearly counsel on each side would 
formulate the exception in such a way as to support their claim.  
As for assignment of legal categories, in Boostrider we have a statute 
that uses a word to refer to a category of things we do not want in the 
park; let us call it “VEHICLEstatute,”76 but the statute itself cannot tell us what 
the contents of VEHICLEstatute are. Admittedly, there are hints in the statute, 
particularly the preamble the legislature adopted, which specifically 
identifies cars and pickups, and might be interpreted to have an 
application limited to things that could endanger public safety or damage 
public property. We can read a dictionary to see the defined meaning and 
examples. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “vehicle” as a “means 
of conveyance or transport on land, having wheels, runners, or the like; a 
car, cart, truck, carriage, sledge, etc.”77 Assuming we could see the 
category of things as reasonably definite, we might call it “VEHICLEdict.” 
Another approach is to ask what use people commonly make of the word. 
For example, we could collect a great body or corpus of language used on 
 
 74. Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 54 notes: “Logic, like mathematics, explores relations 
between ideas rather than correspondence to facts. The legal system cannot be indifferent to issues of 
empirical truth.” Aristotle acknowledged this difficulty regarding universal major premises of the form 
“All A are B,” in the Posterior Analytics, when he asserted that “[i]t is impossible to perceive what is 
universal and holds in every case.” Aristotle, supra note 64, bk. A, ch. 31, at 43. He admits that we can 
“grasp the universal from seeing,” id., but this is, of course, a form of induction. Nevertheless, one 
syllogism can provide as its conclusion a premise to be used in another syllogism.  
 75. See supra text accompanying notes 38–49. 
 76. Here, I use small-caps to indicate that “VEHICLEstatute” refers to a word’s meaning or a category 
of things to which it refers (the distinction is important philosophically, but not for our purposes here). 
When I refer to the word/label “vehicle,” I use quotation marks, and when I refer to an actual thing, like 
my own car, I do not set the word off with any marks. So, if I say I call my vehicle a “vehicle”—intending 
to mean that is a VEHICLEstatute, I am applying a label to a thing to assert that is an instance of the category 
defined in the statute. 
 77. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 39.  
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websites, like the iWeb corpus.78 We could then systematically examine 
in which contexts “vehicle” appears. If it appears most commonly with 
automobiles and similar large, heavy machines, but rarely with bicycles 
or skateboards, we might conclude that uses outside the large-heavy-
machine context should not be part of the meaning of “vehicle”—that is, 
should not be part of VEHICLEcorpus.79 
Deduction cannot tell us whether VEHICLEstatute should overlap 
completely, or at least more nearly completely, with VEHICLEdict or 
VEHICLEcorpus. But lawyers must argue and the court must explain whether 
a Boosted Board falls into that category to apply the deductive rule.80 As 
Judge Posner notes: “[l]egal rules frequently treat as referential words 
(like ‘day’ and ‘night’) that do not have a definite referent,” as there is no 
definite boundary between day and night.81  
Deduction is not sufficient—but neither is it necessary to resolve 
questions of these kinds. Consider the court’s decision in State v. Biker, 
where it did not articulate a deductive rule that it derived from the statute, 
or from the statute in conjunction with State v. Cyclist. It simply 
concluded after describing the facts of the case that they fell within the 
statute. This is not an uncommon argumentative move for a court to 
make.82 In fact, on the traditional theory of the common law, if a court 
announces a covering rule that covers more ground than required to 
resolve the case against it, that rule is dictum.83 That silence regarding a 
 
 78. BYU CORPORA: BILLIONS OF WORDS OF DATA: FREE ONLINE ACCESS, corpus.byu.edu (last 
visited May 23, 2018). 
 79. Some jurists and scholars believe corpus-linguistic methods like this to be useful for 
establishing the meaning of statutory text, especially older texts. See generally, Thomas R. Lee & Stephen 
C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L. J. 788 (2018). See id. at 836–43 (addressing 
specifically whether a bicycle is a “vehicle” within the meaning of a hypothetical statute that was the 
model for this article’s hypothetical Springer Statute § 15.15). Others are not so convinced. See generally, 
Carissa Byrne Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1503 (focusing on 
criminal statutes); Ethan J. Herenstein, The Faulty Frequency Hypothesis: Difficulties in Operationalizing 
Ordinary Meaning Through Corpus Linguistics, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 112 (2017) (criticizing more 
broadly the “frequency hypothesis” upon which the author claims Lee and Mouritsen’s arguments 
depend).  
 80. Of course, this is the task of classification, the narrower use of legal analogy that is the focus 
of this article. See supra text accompanying notes 42–55. 
 81. Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 46. See also Weinreb, supra note 3, at 58 (“[A]lthough 
the words that we use to describe our experience are cast as discrete categories, the actual phenomena are 
mostly continuous.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Adams v. N.J. Steamboat Co., 45 N.E. 369 (N.Y. 1896), discussed at length in 
Brewer, supra note 2, at 1003–06, and in Weinreb, supra note 3, at 16–19, 79–81. Weinreb asserts 
vigorously that such a rule is “not normally to be found.” Id. at 79. 
 83. See Edward H. Levi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (2013) (“Where case law is 
considered . . . [the judge] is not bound by the statement of the rule of law made by the prior judge even 
in the controlling case. The statement is mere dictum.”); Weinreb, supra note 3, at 61 n.31 (noting that 
stating a “covering rule” in a case “would have been dictum, because it was not necessary to the 
decision”); Schauer, THINKING, supra note 7, at 56 (“Because a reason is necessarily broader than the 
outcome that it is a reason for, giving a reason is saying something broader then [sic] necessary to decide 
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covering rule in State v. Biker need not prevent the lawyers in State v. 
Boostrider from arguing that there is such a rule as suggested above.84  
Nevertheless, when discussing legal analogy, some scholars—
Brewer’s skeptics—are prepared to accept it only if it is recast in valid 
deductive form, where either a covering rule or general principle is the 
major premise. In the Boostrider case, this effort might take this form: 
 
VALID DEDUCTIVE FORM: VEHICLE IN BOOSTRIDER 
 Rule/principle:  Every machine in or on which a person can ride 
that has a motor is a “vehicle.” 
 Minor Premise:  Ms. Boostrider operated a machine with a motor. 
 Conclusion:  Ms. Boostrider operated a vehicle. 
 
Once this determination is made, it is a trivial matter to apply the 
statutory rule deductively and convict Ms. Boostrider. But how does one 
identify the rule or principle? 
In his discussion of the application of legal analogy—in arguing from 
precedent—Professor Schauer asserts there is a process first of 
identifying relevant similarities between a cited case and an instant case, 
then assigning “categories of assimilation”85 that make the cited case 
serve as a guide in the instant case.86 We identify the relevant similarities, 
making “this determination from some other organizing standard 
specifying which similarities are important and which we can safely 
ignore.”87  
Schauer offers an example to help define what he means by categories 
of assimilation. He asks us to “[i]magine a faculty meeting considering a 
request from a student for an excused absence from an examination in 
order to attend the funeral of his sister.”88 Assuming the faculty grants the 
request without comment, for what is it a precedent? Can students expect 
to be excused “to attend the funerals of grandparents, aunts, uncles, 
cousins, nieces, nephews, close friends, and pets”?89 The answer, he tells 
us, depends on how broadly the category of assimilation is drawn. The 
decedent in the first case could be characterized as “a sibling, a relative, 
 
the particular case. And that seems to be dicta.”); Schauer, Precedent, supra note 7, at 580 (noting that 
the rule of the case is considered dictum, though even dictum from a precedent places an argumentative 
burden on a present-day arguer).  
 84. See supra text accompanying notes 75 and 76.  
 85. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 7, at 582. 
 86. See id. at 586 (discussing use of categories of assimilation in Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat’l 
League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922)). 
 87. Id. at 577. 
 88. Id. at 578. 
 89. Id. at 578. 
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a blood relative, and one with whom the student has a ‘meaningful 
relationship.’”90 The breadth of the category chosen will bring the new 
case into it or not. Thus “we must consider the way in which the size of 
the categories of assimilation might largely determine the strength of 
precedent.”91 
But is there a rule or principle of categorization? On the one hand, the 
earlier court or faculty may not have specified the category into which it 
assimilated the cited case. It may just have granted or denied the request. 
The next student to come before the faculty can argue for any of the 
candidate categories mentioned in the previous paragraph. On the other 
hand, it may have adopted a rule of the case—“canonical language” with 
an “articulated characterization.”92 For example, perhaps the faculty 
adopted a resolution to excuse the student from examinations to attend the 
funeral, reciting the fact that the student has a “bona fide relationship” or 
“close familial relationship” with the decedent.93 
In any event, Schauer appears to believe that a category of assimilation 
must be drawn to join the cited case to the instant case or to distinguish 
the two. This then permits a quasi-deductive application as in the example 
VALID DEDUCTIVE FORM: VEHICLE IN BOOSTRIDER above. 
In Professor Sunstein’s view, the legal arguer must use some low-level 
principle (but not a general legal rule) to bring the precedent and instant 
case into alignment. So, in an extended example drawn on R.A.V. v. City 
of Saint Paul,94 a case addressing a local ordinance that prohibited cross-
burning, Sunstein purports to use analogical reasoning to develop and test 
possible theoretical statements at this low level of abstraction, such as 
“[a]cts that qualify as speech can be regulated if they produce anger or 
resentment”95 and “[u]nprotected acts of expression may not be regulated 
on the basis of viewpoint.”96 The result of this process is some quasi-
deductive form applying a principle or rule that underlies the analogy for 
it to work. 
Judge Posner appears to share Schauer’s view that a rule must be 
adopted to make the move from precedent to instant case, and that it 
 
 90. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 7, at 579. 
 91. Id. at 591. 
 92. Id. at 579. 
 93. The Ninth Circuit dealt with such an issue when it decided that a grandparent had a “bona fide 
relationship” with a visa-seeker for purposes of President Trump’s ban against travel from certain 
countries; concluding that a grandparent belonged in those categories at least as much as a mother-in-law, 
which the Supreme Court had previously ruled was close enough. State v. Trump, 871 F. 3d 646, 651, 
659 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087–88 (2017)). 
 94. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 95. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 760. 
 96. Id. at 762. 
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“presupposes some, and possibly extensive categorization.”97 He offers 
this example: 
 
The property lawyer who says that oil and gas are analogous to 
rabbits, deer, and other wild animals is really proposing that the rule 
governing property rights in such animals—the “rule of capture”—
is an instance of a more general rule that subsumes oil and gas: the 
rule that there are no nonpossessory rights in fugitive resources.98 
 
Posner acknowledges that “[t]he problem then is to justify the general 
rule, which cannot be done either syllogistically or analogically.”99  
Posner appears less concerned with identifying the categories of 
assimilation from previous cases along the lines of Schauer. Though he 
acknowledges that to “see one problem as being like another that has 
already been solved is indeed to place the new problem on the road to 
solution,”100 what matters for him from the precedents are the “values, 
considerations, policies, and ethical insights found in” them.101 
Professor Alexander claims that “analogical reasoning in law,” or 
“ARIL,” as he calls it, does not exist, that it is a fantasy; and that if it did 
exist, it would be “deformed.”102 He argues that if a court’s decision is 
justified, it must be by one of three means: “showing it is morally 
justified,” “showing that it follows deductively from an authoritative rule 
that governs the case,” or “discernment [and presumably application] of 
principles immanent in cited cases.103 Alexander concludes that the first 
two forms of justification cannot provide an account of legal analogy, but 
he believes the third can provide “the best account that can be given to 
ARIL.” For him, the immanent principles need to be applied deductively 
to have rational force. 
Alexander doubts even this account of legal analogy is worth pursuing, 
though, because he notes that those who wrote the cited cases may have 
made mistakes—these are the “bad beginnings” to which his title refers. 
The deductive form may be valid, but the premises might prove to be 
 
 97. Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 90. 
 98. Id. supra note 3, at 89. 
 99. Id. at 89. See also id. at 91 (“A set of cases can compose a pattern. But when lawyers or judges 
differ on what pattern it composes, their disagreement cannot be resolved . . . by the methods of scientific 
induction.”). 
 100. Id. at 91. 
 101. Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 93. 
 102. Alexander, supra note 7, at 57. 
 103. Id. at 70–72. Note that Alexander contends that the first two “two types of justification exhaust 
the field for law,” id. at 70, despite then acknowledging that “both of these methodologies have room for 
analogical reasoning of the type Brewer endorses,” id. at 72. For details on Brewer’s approach, see infra 
text accompanying notes 107–130. 
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incorrect. As for the case-to-case reasoning identified above and in some 
other models of legal analogy, Alexander argues that because “the 
relevance of . . . similarities and dissimilarities remains unjustified, . . . 
this version of ARIL lacks any rational force.”104 
According to Professor Brewer “the rule of law ideal norms of clarity, 
notice, and accountability presuppose that legal commands . . . are 
deductively applicable, and that vague norms—of the sort with which one 
is left if legal commands are not deductively applicable—are inconsistent 
with those basic values.”105 First, it is fair to acknowledge the Brewer was 
writing about legal norms rather than legal arguments. Nevertheless, the 
principal evidence we have about the content and application of legal 
norms in practical contexts is what appears in the arguments of lawyers 
and judges. Consequently, if Brewer’s assertion is true of legal norms, it 
should also be true of legal argument. A dedication to deduction in legal 
argument is in some sense, however, trivial: a valid deductive form has 
the highest degree of rational force precisely because it is difficult to 
imagine anyone arguing with the form of a valid deduction. The 
conclusion really does not tell us anything that we did not know after 
reading the premises.106  
Given that deduction cannot do all the work of legal argument and is 
not needed for some of it, we must consider other candidates. Before we 
do, however, we will consider Professor Brewer’s account; though he 
says it is not skeptical, it appears still to lean too heavily on deduction. 
2. Abduction and Brewer’s Account 
Professor Brewer is the first of these scholars to propose a method for 
producing arguments by legal analogy. His goal is ultimately to “construct 
and rely on a type of deductively applicable rule,”107 what he calls an 
“Analogy Warranting Rule.”108 In brief, the process involves the 
proponent of the argument using “abduction” to find a candidate analogy-
warranting rule; the testing and justification of the candidate rule using 
what he calls an “Analogy Warranting Rationale;” and then applying the 
rule to the instant case.109 The analogy-warranting rule should be a 
“relatively precise norm . . . so as to provide guidance in relevantly similar 
 
 104. Id. at 86-87 n.96. 
 105. Brewer, supra note 2, at 992–93. 
 106. As a result, the syllogism is either empty of value or is a form of question begging or petitio 
principii. See Barker, supra note 22, at 244.  
 107. Brewer, supra note 2, at 927. 
 108. Id. at 962. The choice of “analogy warranting rule” as the name is peculiar because, as we shall 
see, the rule Brewer offers does not warrant the analogy but is the result of it. 
 109. Id. at 962–63. 
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cases.”110  
Brewer makes the case for needing a rule. He claims that no precedent 
or example “can serve as an example without a rule to specify what about 
it is exemplary.”111 In a sense, this is a form of question begging. It is also 
apparently not true in practice. If we consider a precedent, an example of 
where the plaintiff won in a products liability dispute, one need not have 
any more “rule” than that for it to be an example.112 Whether it is a useful 
example for legal analogy of course depends on characteristics it shares 
with a case at bar: whether they are subject to the same jurisdiction’s laws; 
whether the plaintiff’s claim arises from the same (or similar) substantive 
law; and whether the facts of the cases are similar. Once we have 
answered these and perhaps other non-rule questions, we may argue that 
the case at bar should (or should not) come out for plaintiff. Brewer could 
argue that the principle that allows the identification of these particular 
similarities is a rule, but that reduces all identification of similarities to 
the application of rules, only because the need to do so is assumed. 
Brewer provides the following schema for his approach: 
 
Where x, y, z are individuals and F, G, H, are predicates of 
individuals: 
Step 1:  z has characteristics F, G, . . . . 
Step 2:  x, y, . . . have characteristics F, G, . . . . 
Step 3:  x, y, . . . also have characteristic H. 
Step 4:  The presence in an individual of characteristics F, 
G, . . . provides sufficient warrant for inferring that H 
is also present in that individual. 
Step 5:  Therefore, there is sufficient warrant to conclude that 
H is present in z.113 
 
This schema works a little differently than the deductive argument forms 
described above. This is in part because there are two arguments here. 
The first argument derives the analogy-warranting rule shown in step 4; 
the second applies that rule to z.  
On Brewer’s model, the abduction to the rule in step 4 happens as a 
result of the argument’s proponent “sifting through examples . . . that 
seem instructively similar to his own case”—here the examples in x, y, 
 
 110. Id. at 981. 
 111. Id. at 974. 
 112. Indeed, Professor Weinreb argues the presence of an explicit rule in the cited case is not 
dispositive: “The rule is a generalized statement of the decision, not the predicate on which the decision 
rests.” Weinreb, supra note 3, at 85. 
 113. Brewer, supra note 2, at 966 (notes omitted). 
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etc.—and then constructing a rule that explains the similarities.114 The 
abduction itself is as Brewer says “an imaginative and somewhat untamed 
moment of rational insight,” though he argues that the rest of the process 
constrains it.115 In short, the analogy-warranting rationale must explain 
and justify the rule, and if no such rationale can be found, the rule must 
be changed or discarded. 
As we are interested in argumentation, abduction is not helpful for our 
model. The imaginative leap of the abducer—a “creative insight” or 
“flash of insight”116—might be difficult to describe, and even if it is 
described, it will seem irrelevant in the presence of the analogy-
warranting rule and its rationale, which do not become more acceptable 
in virtue of the abduction being described. 
Missing from Brewer’s schema is the step of creating the analogy-
warranting rationale. This is especially important given Brewer’s reliance 
on the rationale to tame any rule arising from the untamed insight of the 
abduction. His article also devotes comparatively little space to the 
topic.117 Nevertheless, he asserts an important role for these rationales: 
namely the establishment of the justification or “acceptability” of the 
analogy-warranting rule.118 
Brewer offers mostly clues about what the rationale should look like. 
First, he considers whether the analogy-warranting rule is consistent with 
other legal rationales, whether it “cohere[s] sufficiently with explanatory 
and justificatory rationales that the reasoner is unwilling to amend.”119 
Second, he considers whether it “effects an acceptable sorting” of the 
precedents and the instant case.120 As for consistency with other legal 
rationales or values, Brewer identifies some specific lines of argument: 
an “inherent fairness” value and the value of stare decisis,121 and the “rule 
of law value” which “requires laws to be consistent.”122 
Brewer does not explain how or why it is that the extended analogy-
warranting rationale does not appear in most legal arguments, or why its 
absence does not tend to draw critiques from the opponents of those 
arguments.123 He gives an example of only one instance where a court 
appears thoroughly to provide the rationale, and even that one he 
 
 114. Id. at 979. 
 115. Id. at 1026. 
 116. Id. at 979. 
 117. Fewer than 10 of more than 100 pages in the article. 
 118. Brewer, supra note 2, at 1022. 
 119. Id. at 1022-23. 
 120. Id. at 1022–23. 
 121. Id. at 1025. 
 122. Id. at 1025–26. 
 123. See Weinreb, supra note 3, at 10. 
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concludes was wrongly decided.124 It may well be, however, that he sees 
legal analogies as “structurally enthymematic exemplary arguments”125 
and concludes that the rationale is an omitted premise. 
As the term “enthymeme” will come up again, it is worth explaining 
now: an enthymeme is a common technique in argumentation, in which 
the argument’s proponent suppresses one or more propositions where the 
context can supply them.126 Interpreting and critiquing such an argument 
requires reconstruction of the suppressed proposition(s). For example, a 
conservative political candidate might say: “my opponent will attempt to 
curtail gun rights because she is a Democrat.” The argument represents a 
valid deduction with a suppressed major premise: “all Democrats attempt 
to curtail gun rights.”127 Speakers use enthymemes for at least two 
reasons: first, speakers avoid accountability for uttering the suppressed 
proposition(s); they can honestly say, “I never said that!” and disagree 
with a critic’s reconstruction of the argument. Second, speakers 
encourage the audience to supply the suppressed proposition(s), which 
may enhance the audience’s adherence to the proposition(s).128 
 
 124. See Brewer, supra note 2, at 1024–26 (discussing E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. 
Claiborne-Reno Co., 64 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1933)). 
 125. Id. at 987. 
 126. Id. at 984, describes them as “any argument—valid or invalid, deductive or nondeductive—
the logical form of which is not perspicuous from its original manner of presentation.” According to 
Barker, “[a]n argument is called an enthymeme if at least one of its premises is unstated,” Barker, supra 
note 22, at 221, but the term can also be “extended to arguments whose conclusions have been left 
unstated,” id. at 222. 
 127. It is possible that even two propositions might be suppressed. For example, if a reporter asks 
a conservative political candidate, “Do you think your opponent would attempt to curtail gun rights?” the 
candidate might respond simply, “She’s a Democrat.” Here, the major premise and conclusion are 
suppressed. 
 128. According to contemporary researchers in organizational communication: 
 
Through enthymemes, the [rhetor] persuades the audience by drawing on its cultural 
beliefs and attitudes. It invites the audience to complete the argument based on 
identification with the rhetor’s background . . . . Enthymemes are a powerful tool of 
persuasion because they allow audience members to draw on their preexisting 
beliefs—those that are integral to the institutional order. 
 
E. Johanna Hartelius & Larry D. Browning, The Application of Rhetorical Theory in Managerial 
Research, 22 MGMT. COMM. Q. 13, 24 (2008). George Kennedy characterized Aristotle’s view: 
 
The real determinant of an enthymeme in contrast to a syllogism is what a popular 
audience will understand without tiresome pedantry. Aristotle regards . . . the 
enthymeme[] as addressed to an audience that cannot be assumed to follow intricate 
logical argument or will be impatient with premises that seem obvious. 
 
ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 42 n.55 (George A. Kennedy tran., 2d ed. 
2007). 
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Arguments, even in law, are commonly enthymematic.129 
Brewer’s schema for legal analogy obscures the work of the analogy, 
and his description of the analogy-warranting rationale is too rudimentary 
to provide clear guidelines. Consequently, it seems unlikely that Brewer’s 
model “provides clear criteria that lawyers, judges, students, and scholars 
can use critically to assess any given argument by analogy.”130 
3. Induction: Not Helpful for Legal Argument 
I will follow Barker in describing inductive arguments as “arguments 
whose conclusions do not strictly follow from the premises and are not 
claimed to do so, but whose conclusions can in principle be tested by 
further [empirical] observations.”131 So “if the premises of an inductive 
argument are true and the reasoning is good, then it is reasonable to 
believe the conclusion; the conclusion is probably true.”132 An inductive 
argument, even if valid when made, is by definition defeasible. In other 
words, even if all the premises are true, further observations of particulars 
in the world could yield evidence that defeats the conclusion.  
There are two brands of induction: inductive generalization, also called 
“enumerative induction,”133 and inductive analogy, which is a special case 
of hypothesis evaluation.134 Each of these types of argument is important 
in managing day-to-day human affairs but has limited utility in legal 
argument. 
Lawyers may refer to “induction” when talking about legal arguments, 
but neither of these argumentation forms will sort out the problems in 
State v. Boostrider because “induction,” at least by Barker’s definition, 
requires circumstances where the truth of the conclusion in the argument 
can be tested by further observation.135 Legal argumentation is normative 
and productive, in that if a court adopts a conclusion, it becomes the law. 
But it is not defeasible in the same way as an inductive argument; more 
observations about the world cannot defeat the conclusion of a legal 
 
 129. Brewer, supra note 2, at 984. 
 130. Id. at 925. 
 131. Barker, supra note 22, at 13. See also Brewer, supra note 2, at 945 (“In inductive argument, 
the truth of the premises never guarantees the truth of the conclusion.”).  
 132. Barker, supra note 22, at 181. 
 133. James Hawthorne, Inductive Logic § 1, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2018), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/logic-inductive/ 
(last visited May 23, 2018). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See supra text accompanying note 131. See also Weinreb, supra note 3, at 2 (distinguishing 
legal reasoning from inductive reasoning; “The reasoning of a doctor or an engineer is readily and in the 
normal course put to the test. The patient’s health improves, or it does not; the bridge stands, or it falls.”); 
id. at 5 (An inductive argument is not formally bound in the same way [as deductive], but the conclusion 
can be tested experimentally, and, again, either it is verified or it is not.”). 
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argument. If the court in Boostrider concludes the Boosted Board is a 
vehicle, no later-discovered instance of a court saying a Boosted Board is 
not a vehicle will change the outcome in Boostrider. There is no way to 
observe empirically whether the conclusion is correct.136 What lawyers 
need is what Barker calls “non-inductive analogy.” 
4. Analogy and the Mystics 
The non-inductive analogy is a way to reason about normative 
outcomes from past events. This is the form that Sunstein identifies with 
legal analogy. Barker asks us to imagine that a university honor code 
prohibits “lying” and “cheating” and that the honor council must then 
determine whether a student who has written a bad check137 has violated 
the honor code.138  
Lying and cheating are indisputably offenses against the honor code. 
Now, writing a bad check is like falsely stating that you have money 
in the bank. Also, writing a bad check is very like cheating, for you 
persuade the merchant to accept the check in exchange for 
merchandise by deceptively suggesting that the check is good. Since 
writing a bad check is so like lying and cheating in these respects, it 
therefore resembles them also in being a violation of the honor 
code.139 
We might formalize the lying side of this argument in this way: 
 
NON-INDUCTIVE ANALOGY: HONOR CODE 
 Major premise:  Lying is an honor code violation in virtue of the 
fact that the liar makes a false statement. 
 Minor premise:  Writing what one knows to be a bad check 
involves making a false statement about funds 
available in one’s bank account.140 
 Conclusion:  Writing what one knows to be a bad check should 
be classified as a violation of the honor code. 
 
 136. Though, of course, there can be further arguments about whether the argument supporting the 
conclusion was a good one. See also Sunstein, supra note 8, at 745 n.18. 
 137. Some readers may never have handled a checkbook, though they are still quite common, I 
believe. A check is a “draft . . . signed by the drawer, payable on demand, drawn on a bank, and 
unconditionally negotiable.” Check, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). A bad check is one “that 
is not honored because the account either contains insufficient funds or does not exist.” Id. 
 138. See Barker, supra note 22, at 225. 
 139. Barker, supra note 22, at 226–27. 
 140. I am grateful to Dr. Randy Gordon for pointing out on an earlier draft that this minor premise 
did not include the drafter’s knowledge; without the check writers’ knowledge that the account would be 
overdrawn, this minor premise would probably be false. 
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Barker notes that this is not a deductive argument, something that is 
perhaps self-evident from its lack of deductive form.141 It “differs from 
induction—the conclusion being argued for does not embody predictive 
conjectures going beyond what the premises say.”142 This is like a legal 
analogy, in that further observation cannot test the honor council’s 
decision. The conclusion of the council will prove its own truth.  
Weinreb makes a defense of non-inductive analogy and legal analogy 
as a reliable type of reasoning that is distinct from deduction and 
induction. He pushes back against the thinking of Brewer and others who 
appear to accept legal analogy, despite that fact it is “logically flawed,” 
as part of a “hierarchy of rules” deductively applied; Posner, who appears 
to view it as existing but of little or no value; and Alexander, who claims 
it does not exist in law.143 
Weinreb’s central defense of legal analogy is that analogical reasoning 
works in many human contexts perfectly well without the need for formal 
deductive or inductive machinery.144 He also notes that it is acceptable to 
lawyers and judges: though analogies are at “the center of contention 
between lawyers on opposite sides and between majority and dissenting 
judges, there is scarcely a trace of criticism of analogical argument 
generally. On the contrary, the importance that is usually attached to the 
choice of analogy suggests quite the opposite.”145 “The persistent effort 
of legal scholars to downgrade analogical reasoning, if not, indeed, to 
dismiss it altogether, is simply ignored by the lawyers and judges who 
regularly employ it.”146 Thus, “[i]f the normative force of law depends on 
its commitment to reason, a place has to be found for analogical 
arguments on their own terms.”147  
This is fine as far as it goes, but while Weinreb critiques the approach 
proposed by Brewer in some detail,148 he does not offer his own model 
for constructing or evaluating arguments. Instead, he grounds his support 
for legal analogy sans deductive covering rules in the practical wisdom 
of attorneys practicing it. He writes, for example, that a legal reasoner 
 
 141. Id. at 227. Given the brief discussion of the enthymeme above, see supra text accompanying 
notes 126–128, it might be tempting to reconstruct this in a deductive argument form. What is missing is 
perhaps a major premise along the lines of “Whatever is like lying and cheating ought to count as an honor 
offense.” Id. at 282 n.46. The problem, as Barker notes, is that such a premise may not be both “known to 
us and sufficient to render the argument deductively valid.” Id. Worse, it may simply function as question 
begging or petitio principii, that is, the premise assumes the conclusion. Id. 
 142. Id. at 227. 
 143. Weinreb, supra note 3, at 8–9. 
 144. Id. 114–22. 
 145. Id. at 10. 
 146. Id. at 134. 
 147. Id. at 113. 
 148. Weinreb, supra note 3, at 107–13. 
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“will quickly dismiss most of the concrete details of the situation before 
him . . . as irrelevant to [a party’s] liability, not because he knows and can 
recite a multitude of rules so providing but because his accumulated 
experience in the law tells him that those facts are not likely to count.”149 
This continues the cognitivist approach discussed above, which argues for 
the reasonableness of reasoning by legal analogy but does not provide a 
structure for constructing and assessing arguments by legal analogy.150 
The problem is that arguments by analogy are hard to discipline. Even 
when used by logicians, analogies can be unruly. Consider two examples 
from Barker: 
 
Suppose the postman once met a boxer dog and found that it had a 
bad temper and tendency to bite. If he now meets another boxer dog, 
he may reason by analogy that this dog also is likely to have a bad 
temper and a tendency to bite. Here his reasoning rests upon 
analogy.151 
 
Barker does not criticize this conclusion, implying that it is reasonable. 
And he offers another example: 
 
[S]uppose there has been a thunderstorm every afternoon at five 
o’clock for the past week, and I infer that there will rather likely be 
one tomorrow too. Here my data are true and my reasoning may well 
be perfectly logical, and yet is possible that my conclusion is false; 
perhaps no storm occurs on the morrow. Here it was reasonable for 
me to make this inference, even though the conclusion turned out 
not to be true.152 
 
Here, Barker overtly calls this reasoning reasonable. But given the 
premises in these arguments are true, does the form of either make a 
reasonable argument? My neighbor Rosie is a rescue boxer with a sweet 
temperament. Would the postman’s argument be equally strong if he 
concluded, after encountering Rosie, that the next boxer he meets will 
also be sweet tempered? And why is it reasonable to conclude tomorrow’s 
weather will be like today’s, or last week’s? Is it not just as reasonable to 
conclude that tomorrow’s weather is due for a change? In each of these 
cases, either a small number of instances or a failure to theorize the 
 
 149. Id. at 123. He does offer some observations that may be helpful for addressing those questions, 
which I will take up below. See infra text accompanying notes 204–217. 
 150. See supra notes 26–36 and accompanying text. 
 151. Barker, supra note 22, at 191–92. On Barker’s account, this in an inductive analogy, because 
it could be confirmed by further empirical observations. 
 152. Id. at 183 (emphasis added). Again, this is inductive analogy on Barker’s account. 
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relevance of each instance could weakly support a conclusion. 
Barker proposes that an opponent can attack an analogy by saying it is 
not a good comparison (that is, by pointing out differences) or by 
employing a second analogy that is no less reasonable but reaches a 
different conclusion.153 The former advice may not be particularly 
helpful, in that one can always find differences and similarities between 
any two instances or cases.154 The question is which differences are 
relevant and how many are needed to warrant a different conclusion. The 
latter advice helps little more, given that the opponent offers another 
argument, which must itself be subjected to criticism.  
Despite Barker’s claim that “some analogies really are better than 
others,”155 neither his model nor Weinreb’s provides the means of 
constructing or evaluating them. Given that a deductive argument form 
could not operate in our legal context without assistance, and induction is 
inapplicable to decisions of this kind, we must explore possible 
frameworks for non-inductive and legal analogies.  
D. The Aporia: Why We Still Need Answers 
So far, Part I has shown that deduction can do only a tiny part of the 
work of legal argument. At the moment just before the proponent of a 
legal argument applies a universal rule deductively to the facts of her case, 
she has already done all the heavy lifting—ascertaining the legal rule 
(major premise) and classifying operative facts and assigning legal 
categories to the instant facts (minor premises). Induction cannot help. 
And we have a sense that analogy, at least as described here, is 
insufficiently disciplined to permit reliable argument construction and 
critique. 
Legal scholars who have previously approached legal analogy have 
taken three tacks: some believe that a deductive rule lies behind every 
apparent use of legal analogy. Weinreb does not believe this but leaves 
largely unexplained how legal analogy works in its absence. Schauer 
embraces quasi-deductive application of assimilating categories. But 
Alexander and Brewer, and probably Posner, support the claim that a 
deduction must lie beneath the conclusion of any rational legal argument. 
Alexander and Brewer ground that position on the rational force of 
deduction. But of course, that is question begging: rational force is a 
measure of the confidence we can have in the conclusion if the premises 
are true; it ignores the truth of the premises. The law, however, is very 
 
 153. Id. at 227. 
 154. See Brewer, supra note 2, at 932 (“[E]verything is similar to everything else in an infinite 
number of ways, and everything is also dissimilar to everything else in an infinite number of ways.”). 
 155. Barker, supra note 22, at 227, quoted in Brewer, supra note 2, at 952. 
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concerned with whether the premises are true.156 Deduction cannot 
deliver the premises, and applying deduction to premises that are not 
derived deductively can deliver conclusions that are only as sound as the 
weakest argument in the chain. From a practical-theoretical standpoint, 
we need to strengthen that link.  
The solution I propose is to increase our confidence in arguments by 
legal analogy by providing a formal model for creating and criticizing 
them. Part II begins by introducing a different standard for creating and 
assessing legal arguments, drawn from the field of informal logic, and it 
explains the general formal model of the argumentation scheme. Part III 
then presents the argumentation scheme(s) for legal (dis)analogy, 
including a means for assessing relevant (dis)similarity. That section 
concludes with some examples from real legal arguments. 
II. A NEW TACK: INFORMAL LOGIC AND ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES 
This section proposes a pivot from deductive logic to standards that are 
still rational and, though not formally valid, reasonable given the 
circumstances in which we use them. I contend here that by “reasonable” 
arguments we always mean to imply “dialogical” arguments. That is, any 
standard of reasonableness for legal arguments must anticipate that all 
legal arguments withstand critical scrutiny: every argument has a 
proponent and an opponent.157 Even when lawyers predict the outcome of 
legal disputes for clients, they are anticipating the counter-arguments that 
other parties will make. Subsection A introduces informal logic and its 
conception of arguments that proponents assert are rational and 
reasonable but which are defeasible—subject to the critical questions of 
their opponents. Subsection B explains how argumentation schemes 
formalize such dialogic arguments. 
A. A Standard for Good Legal Arguments 
How should we make or assess a good legal argument? Deduction 
plays some role, of course, in application of every general or universal 
rule, but the previous section showed that it is not sufficient or even 
necessary to resolve the questions of classification and evaluation that are 
at the root of many sticky legal problems. This section argues that the law 
should employ argumentation that meets standards of rationality and 
 
 156. See supra note 74. 
 157. See Weinreb, supra note 3, at 46–47 (“A judicial decision of any significance is carefully 
considered and is not likely to be reached until the issue has been debated and alternative outcomes 
forcefully defended. Once rendered, it is subject to review and reconsideration by other judges as well as 
by lawyers and legal scholars.”). 
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reasonableness that are acceptable in the community of law practitioners. 
The next section introduces argumentation schemes. 
First, “[t]he normative order constituted by the legal system, informed 
by ‘rule of law’ principles as well as by many others, aspires to be rational 
in significant ways.”158 According to Professor Brewer:  
 
The criteria that comprise the ideal of the rule of law forge links 
between the correct interpretation of legal texts and two of the basic 
requirements of that ideal, predictability and notice, on the one hand, 
and governmental accountability (restraint on arbitrary 
governmental power, including judicial power), on the other.159  
 
So, “in offering [an] argument, the speaker aspires to satisfy the 
aforementioned rule of law ideals.”160  
Professor Weinreb, meanwhile, notes that “law provides an 
overarching structure within which most human affairs are conducted, 
and it reaches down to the smallest details. If its demands are not to be 
felt as arbitrary and oppressive, they must be, and must be perceived to 
be, reasonable.”161 We can paraphrase Judge Posner to say that legal 
argumentation is “practical argumentation”—“the methods by which 
people who are not credulous form beliefs about matters that cannot be 
verified by logic or exact observation.”162 Posner claims that judges 
reason using many tools:  
 
It is a grab bag that includes anecdote, introspection, imagination, 
common sense, empathy, imputation of motives, speaker’s 
authority, metaphor, analogy, precedent, custom, memory, 
“experience,” intuition, and induction (the expectation of 
regularities, a disposition related both to intuition and to analogy).163 
 
These—along with whatever the judge had for breakfast—may in fact 
 
 158. Brewer, supra note 2, at 929. I take Brewer to mean rational in the sense that Govier means 
it. Compare Govier, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 20, at 45–46 (“Rational persuasion is persuasion by 
considerations that affect the assent of another person by supplying evidence or grounds that make a claim 
seem more believable because of a cogent connection between that claim and the claims cited as its 
support.”) with Chaim Perelman, The Rational and the Reasonable, 10 PHILOSOPHIC EXCH. 29, 29 (“The 
rational corresponds to mathematical reason, . . . which grasps necessary relations, which knows a priori 
certain self-evident and immutable truths, which is at the same time individual and universal.”). 
 159. Brewer, supra note 2, at 991–92 (internal citations omitted). 
 160. Id. at 992. 
 161. Weinreb, supra note 3, at 3 (emphasis added). 
 162. Posner, PROBLEMS, supra note 3, at 71-72.  
 163. Id. at 73. 
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influence judges’ decision-making.164 Consequently, Posner 
distinguishes judges’ methods for making such decisions from their 
methods for justifying those decisions in writing—their reasoning from 
their argumentation.165 But our system requires that (many) judges justify 
their decisions in writing according to standards the legal community 
accepts, and the considerations Posner lists are not all equally acceptable 
under those standards. Legal argument does not value intuition, 
imagination, and speaker’s authority, for example, as much as imputation 
of motives, precedent, custom, and induction. When lawyers write 
persuasive briefs, they are attempting not just to persuade judges, they are 
demonstrating that arguments—acceptable in the context of the legal 
community—exist for the judges to grant their requests. 
Philosophers of informal logic and argumentation theorists call on 
arguments to “involve[] an appeal to the addressee as a rational judge 
who judges reasonably,”166 where we use the terms “‘rationally’ in the 
sense of using one’s faculty of reason and . . . ‘reasonably’ in the sense of 
utilizing one’s faculty of reason in an appropriate way” based on 
“appropriateness standards prevailing in the exchange concerned.”167 In 
short, we must move from concern with the rational force of abstract 
argumentation forms to the cogency of an actual argument: a cogent 
argument has “premises which are acceptable to the audience to whom it 
is addressed, relevant to its conclusion, and sufficient to warrant belief in 
its conclusion.”168  
As long ago as Aristotle, thinkers acknowledged the distinction 
between the kinds of arguments that work in one situation and those that 
work in another. Aristotle, for example, believed that science/knowledge 
(epistêmê) was possible only regarding universal truths that could be 
demonstrated with deductive reasoning.169 Unfortunately, the deductive 
“validity of an argument does not guarantee the truth of its conclusion. 
Logic cannot itself establish or guarantee the truth of the premisses.”170 
Pure deduction and demonstration, then, is available only in fields like 
 
 164. Though not actually studying what judges had for breakfast, Danziger and colleagues showed 
that “extraneous variables” influenced judges’ decision-making. Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Liora 
Avnaim-Pessoa, Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 
(PNAS) 6889, 6892 (2011). They examined a large number of decisions in a class of very similar cases, 
noting differences between those that had happened just before a meal break and those happening just 
after. Id. at 6889–90. 
 165. See Posner, Reasoning, supra note 25, at 91. 
 166. van Eemeren et al., HANDBOOK OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY 5 (2014). 
 167. Id. at 6 n.13. 
 168. Govier, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 20, at 119. 
 169. See Robin Smith, Notes to Aristotle, PRIOR ANALYTICS 105, 127 (Robin Smith tran., 1989). 
See also Aristotle, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS 13 (Jonathan Barnes tran., 2d ed. 1993). 
 170. Neil MacCormick, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW 25 (2005). Common usage among some 
European theorists is to use “premiss” for “premise.” 
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geometry, where the premises are postulated.171 In his treatises about 
reasoning and argumentation on matters of public affairs, including 
legislation and judicial tribunals, Aristotle acknowledged that the 
premises of arguments, whether deductive or no, in those contexts had to 
be drawn from less certain sources, including the views of “most people, 
or the wise . . . . and such opinions as are derived from any established 
arts.”172 
Contemporary philosopher Stephen Toulmin concluded that the 
standard of reasonableness depends on the field in which an argument 
appears, and reasonable arguments may have characteristics that are both 
field-invariant and field-dependent.173 Arguments “belong to the same 
field when the data and conclusions in each of the two arguments are . . . 
of the same logical type.”174 So, for example, arguments about geometry 
proofs, legal status, biological categorization, etc.—all different fields—
might all be subject to deduction, which is field-invariant. But arguments 
about legal status might properly include evidence from witness 
testimony, where arguments about geometry will permit premises only 
from the stock of postulates and theorems already proved; these are field-
dependent constraints. The concept of “field” can be read hierarchically. 
For example, Toulmin notes: “[t]he sorts of evidence relevant in [legal] 
cases of different kinds will naturally be very variable. To establish 
negligence in a civil case, willful intent in a case of murder, the 
presumption of legitimate birth: each of these will require appeal to 
evidence of different kinds.”175 Whether a legal argument is reasonable is 
thus a field-dependent question, with different fields within the law 
potentially having different standards. At the same time, we can expect 
some standards of rationality to be field-invariant in the sense that they 
apply throughout all fields of law. I contend we should expect such 
standards for arguments by legal analogy. 
J. Anthony Blair, Ralph H. Johnson, and Trudy Govier are 
philosophers credited with foundational work in the field of informal 
 
 171. See J. Anthony Blair, Informal Logic and Logic, GROUNDWORK IN THE THEORY OF 
ARGUMENTATION: SELECTED PAPERS OF J. ANTHONY BLAIR 120–21 (2012) [hereinafter Blair, Informal]. 
 172. Aristotle, TOPICS: BOOKS I AND VIII 9 (Robin Smith tran., 1997). The subject of Aristotle’s 
Topics is “dialectic problems,” id. at 10, each of which is “a question which is both important for some 
purpose and the subject of significant disagreement,” Robin Smith, Commentary to id. 41, 56. Aristotle 
incorporates dialectic into his theory of rhetoric, calling rhetoric an “offshoot” of dialectic and “partly” 
dialectic. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC supra note 128, at 39. For Aristotle, rhetoric is the art focused on 
deliberative, judicial, and other civic assemblies in Athens. Id. at 47–48. 
 173. Stephen E. Toulmin, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 14–15 (updated ed. 2003). 
 174. Id. at 14. 
 175. Id. at 16. 
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logic.176 The work of Blair, Johnson, and Govier—and their progeny—
have been widely taken up and discussed.177 
Blair and the founders of informal logic sought to replace “the then-
dominant (in analytic philosophy circles) logico-epistemological criterion 
of ‘soundness’” under which “a ‘good’ argument is a ‘sound’ argument, 
that is, one with true premises and a (deductively) valid inference from 
the premises to the conclusion.”178 They recognized that human beings 
make many good decisions based arguments that are not deductions or 
inductive generalizations.  
They proposed three criteria for a good argument: relevance,179 
acceptability, and sufficiency. So in their view, “an argument is a good 
one if its grounds or premises are . . . relevant as support for the claim in 
question, individually acceptable, and together . . . sufficient to support 
the claim on behalf of which they were offered.”180 What counts as 
sufficient, acceptable, and relevant in a given context depends on the 
circumstances of that context.181 So “[s]pecial fields such as the various 
sciences or professions will have standards peculiar to them for arguments 
about their subject matters.”182 “For example, if the conclusion is 
‘meteorological conditions are excellent,’ and the premise is, 
‘Meteorologists say so,’ we scrutinize the authority much more carefully 
if our purpose in knowing the conclusion is to launch a satellite rocket 
than if it is to proceed with an informal family picnic.”183 
Informal logic is about defeasible arguments, those whose “premises 
supply good reasons for accepting their conclusions” but where 
“challenges from critics or simply the discovery of additional information 
 
 176. See van Eemeren, supra note 166, at 373. Informal logic arose in philosophy classrooms in the 
1960s and 1970s, in response to a sense among philosophy professors and students that courses in formal 
logic did not allow students “to understand and criticize the public policy arguments of the day, 
particularly those published in the media.” Blair, Informal, supra note 171, at 120–21.  
 177. See generally van Eemeren, supra note 166, at 381-87, 390–94, and works cited there. See also 
Blair, Informal, supra note 171, at 119 (noting use of argumentation schemes in artificial intelligence). 
 178. Blair, RAS Today, supra note 20, at 88. See also Govier, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 20, at 6 
(“[T]he [deductive] paradigm is questionable at best. It implies a uniformly negative verdict on the 
soundness of all inductive arguments. Furthermore, it is untrue to the world of partial certainties in which 
human beings function.”). 
 179. This is the relevance of premises to the conclusion they purport to support, not of analogical 
(dis)similarities between cases. 
 180. Blair, RAS Today, supra note 20, at 87. See also Govier, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 20, at 6 
(“[R]eal arguments are based on premises deemed rationally acceptable by arguers and put forward as 
rationally acceptable to the particular audience to whom their argument is addressed and as providing 
reasons sufficient in some context for accepting that conclusion, or at least taking it seriously.”). 
 181. Blair, RAS Today, supra note 20, at 90, 95, 97. Blair acknowledges that “[a]ttempts have been 
made to characterize relevance and sufficiency . . . but no results have found widespread endorsement.” 
Blair, Informal, supra note 171, at 126. 
 182. Blair, RAS Today, supra note 20, at 100. 
 183. Id. at 95. 
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can ‘defeat’” them—can “reduce or remove the force of any justification 
that the original premises supplied for their conclusions.”184 It is in this 
sense a brand of what Judge Posner calls “practical reason.”185 
Many of the scholars whose work was discussed in Part I might be 
uncomfortable with this conception of “logic.” But the non-deductive 
components of legal argument are where the heavy lifting is, despite being 
the logically weaker links in the argument chain. We need to strengthen 
them to the extent we can. One way to do so is through argumentation 
schemes. 
B. Argumentation Schemes and Critical Questions 
Argumentation schemes are formal abstractions of types of argument 
that are commonly used in natural-language discourse, like legal 
arguments. In the conception used here, each argumentation scheme 
consists of a set of premises and the conclusion they support, much like 
the valid deductive form above. Schemes, most often identified with the 
work of philosopher Douglas Walton,186 provide a formal structure to 
construct and evaluate natural-language arguments from the perspective 
of informal logic.  
“These schemes rely on the presumption that reasoning from the kinds 
of grounds and via the kinds of inferences that are identified by such a 
scheme is justified. They presume that such inferences are warranted.”187 
Consequently, once an argument’s proponent constructs it according to a 
valid argumentation scheme, its conclusion is presumptively acceptable, 
and the burden shifts to the argument’s opponent to defeat or weaken it.188 
Thus associated with each argumentation scheme is a set of critical 
questions, the answers to which may defeat the argument or diminish its 
acceptability. Argumentation schemes rely for their rational force on the 
fact that they are routinely exhibited in contexts where their forms go 
largely unchallenged, even if the critical questions throw particular 
arguments into doubt. 
The sort of inquiry suggested by the argumentation scheme, and 
particularly the critical questions, is necessary and sufficient to determine 
in a given context whether to accept a legal argument in that context. 
Argumentation schemes are a necessary adjunct to deductive argument 
forms in that deduction alone cannot deliver an acceptable legal argument. 
 
 184. Blair, Informal, supra note 171, at 123. 
 185. See supra note 162. 
 186. See supra note 11.  
 187. Blair, Informal, supra note 171, at 119. 
 188. See Blair, RAS Today, supra note 20, at 90. 
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Consider the challenges with applying a deduction discussed above.189 In 
fact, we can frame the legal deductive syllogism as a defeasible 
argumentation scheme, showing that the argumentation scheme 
influences the seemingly simple application of deduction in actual legal 
argumentation.  
 
 
ARGUMENTATION SCHEME: ARGUMENT BY LEGAL DEDUCTION190 
 Major Premise:  According to legal authority J, in every instance 
with features f1 . . . fn, legal category A applies.  
 Minor Premise:  The instant case has features f1 . . . fn. 
 Conclusion:  Legal category A applies in the instant case. 
 
 
We can instantiate this scheme using State v. Boostrider from above:191 
 
ARGUMENT BY LEGAL DEDUCTION: STATE V. BOOSTRIDER 
 Major Premise:  According to Springer statutes section 15.15, any 
person who operates a vehicle in the municipal 
park is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. 
 Minor Premise:  Ms. Boostrider operated a vehicle in a municipal 
park. 
 Conclusion:  Ms. Boostrider is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. 
 
 
In an appropriate context of informal logic, this argument is 
presumptively valid. Indeed, these allegations (perhaps with some more 
detail) are probably sufficient to sustain a prosecutor’s indictment of Ms. 
Boostrider. But every lawyer knows that Ms. Boostrider’s attorney will 
explore, and the prosecutor had better be ready to respond to, at least the 
following critical questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 189. See supra text accompanying notes 73–81.  
 190. See the comment below about the preliminary nature of this argumentation scheme. I do not 
intend it to be complete; there may indeed be other critical questions applicable to it. A more through 
discussion of the scheme will have to wait until another time. 
 191. See supra text accompanying notes 38–41. 
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CRITICAL QUESTIONS: ARGUMENT BY LEGAL DEDUCTION 
CQ1 Acceptable Scheme Question: Does legal authority J actually say 
that legal category A applies in every instance with features f1 . . . 
fn? That is, is the legal rule advanced a deductive one? 
CQ2 Jurisdiction Question: Does legal authority J have authority over 
the persons or things in the instant case?  
CQ3 Authority Question: Does legal authority J govern the law 
applicable in the instant case?  
CQ4 Exception Precedent Question: Has any legal authority identified 
an exception to the rule or is there any previous similar case where 
the rule was not applied?  
CQ5 Exception Policy Question: Does the policy underlying the rule 
suggest there should be any exceptions?  
CQ6 Instant Features Question: Does instant case have features f1 . . . 
fn? 
CQ7 Feature Question: With regard to each feature f1 . . . fn, has any 
legal authority defined it or narrowed or expanded its definition?  
 
Each of the critical questions can spawn an argument of its own 
regarding its outcome, the result of which may be to weaken or defeat the 
presumptive argument. Each question addresses one or more of the factors 
for assessing arguments, whether the premises and argument form are 
relevant, acceptable, and sufficient to support the conclusion. So, for 
example, with regard to CQ1, what counts as an acceptable 
argumentation scheme is context dependent. For example, if section 15.15 
had been a factor test or other kind of legal standard,192 the deductive 
argumentation scheme would be inappropriate here. This question tests 
whether the argument’s proponent has misstated the major premise/rule. 
The rest of the critical questions test the truth of the premises, CQ2–
CQ5 testing the major premise and CQ6 and CQ7 testing the minor 
premise. CQ2 and CQ3 address the applicability of the legal authority to 
the current case. In our example, perhaps the alleged offense took place 
in one jurisdiction but J is the law in a different jurisdiction. Or perhaps J 
is a statute that by its own terms governs only the use of motor vehicles 
subject to registration with the state, but the instant case involves a 
motorized skateboard. CQ4 and CQ5 consider whether there is or should 
 
 192. For Weinreb, rules “provide a determinate response to specific facts” and standards “call for 
consideration of all the circumstances,” though he notes that it is debated whether the difference is 
meaningful. Weinreb, supra note 3, at 6 n.3. 
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be any exception to this rule. In our example under CQ4, perhaps a court 
concluded that a person who drives onto parkland by necessity is excused. 
The second prong of this question identifies where there might be an 
implied exception based on a previous case where the rule was not 
applied. As for CQ5, perhaps a legislative pronouncement identifies a 
policy, and giving the rule too great or too small a scope would frustrate 
that policy or interfere with other policy objectives of equal 
importance.193 
CQ6 asks only whether the proponent of the argument has actually 
asserted that all of features f1 . . . fn are present. CQ7 does the more 
complicated work of exploring the features to see if they are properly 
applied here. For example, State v. Cyclist appears to have narrowed the 
definition of “vehicle” in Springer statutes section 15.15. Perhaps 
“vehicle” is defined somewhere else in Springer’s statutes that by its own 
terms applies to section 15.15 or that may be applied by analogy.194  
I contend that when an argumentation scheme is properly 
characterized, the list of critical questions it provides is exclusive; that is, 
any challenge to an argument made in the form required by the 
argumentation scheme will come in the form of one or more of the critical 
questions identified.195  
While this article is about the argumentation scheme for legal analogy, 
not legal deduction, this example appears here to demonstrate how readily 
critical questions complicate deductive argument forms in the law, and 
how argument-schematic thinking is a necessary adjunct to legal 
argument. The instance where a legal deduction can take place without 
consideration of critical questions is rare, and once the questions are 
settled, the deduction itself is trivial (and really, not that informative). 
Argumentation schemes are a sufficient adjunct to deductive argument 
forms according to two perspectives. First, inasmuch as it is the best we 
can hope to do, it has to be sufficient. The two types of argument—
deduction and induction—that might have a claim to greater rational force 
are simply not up to the task.  
Second, in contexts subject to human judgment about normative 
matters, argumentation schemes represent good arguments. Lawyers, who 
are motivated to find flaws in their opponents’ arguments, do not attack 
 
 193. See generally Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), in which the Supreme 
Court read the word “reasonable” into the Sherman Act. 
 194. In the Boostrider case, the analyst must of course also consider the same question with regard 
to whether the defendant operated and whether the event happened in a municipal park. 
 195. This is both an empirical and normative issue, however. Normatively, we must ask whether a 
certain critical question should be permitted to defeat the argumentation scheme; in other words, is it 
rational to pose the critical question? Empirically, we must ask whether a certain critical question is 
permitted; in other words, do practitioners in the field object to its use? The latter question is the focus of 
the empirical work described infra note 256. 
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the form of their opponents’ arguments when their opponents use the 
techniques described here. A lawyer who has offered a presumptive legal 
deduction does not react with outrage when her opponent attacks it with 
the critical questions noted above.196 In short, argumentation schemes 
present evidence that the arguer is using one’s faculty of reason in an 
appropriate way based on appropriateness standards prevailing in the 
exchange concerned.197 
Of course, it is possible that two such arguments can be constructed 
regarding a given legal question that point to contradictory conclusions; 
they should nevertheless have sharpened the issues to give the decision-
maker the best chance of making (and justifying) a good choice.  
As we saw in Part I, analogy is too undisciplined to satisfy our 
expectations about rationality in the law. Part II has shown that 
argumentation schemes discipline legal argument by establishing 
burdens—the premises the proponent must assert for the argument to be 
presumptively acceptable—and critical questions—the acceptable 
avenues upon which an opponent may attack or undermine the argument. 
Part III proposes, discusses, and applies the legal analogy and legal 
(dis)analogy argumentation schemes in legal argument. 
III. THE LEGAL (DIS)ANALOGY ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES 
Part II demonstrated that legal arguments (even the apparently air-tight 
deduction) can be recast schematically using argumentation schemes and 
that this approach to legal argumentation is rational and reasonable. This 
part delivers on the promise of this article to provide a formal description 
of legal analogy as an argumentation scheme. It also describes the legal 
(dis)analogy argumentation scheme and explores the question of relevant 
similarity more deeply. It concludes with an analysis of some actual 
lawyers’ arguments. 
A. Legal Analogy Argumentation Scheme 
Here is the argumentation scheme for legal analogy with a cited case, 
and a case at bar, the instant case.198  
 
 
 
 
 
 196. See Weinreb, supra note 3, at 10. 
 197. See supra text accompanying notes 166 and 167. 
 198. This argumentation scheme is adapted from Walton et al., supra note 11, at 55–66. 
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ARGUMENTATION SCHEME: ARGUMENT BY LEGAL ANALOGY 
Major Premise:  Cited case and instant case are relevantly similar 
in that both have features f1 . . . fn, and features 
f1 . . . fn are relevant to legal category A.  
Minor Premise:  Legal category A applies to cited case. 
Conclusion:  Legal category A applies to instant case.  
 
Notice that the major premise in this scheme is really a relevant 
similarity premise and actually contains three assertions for each feature 
f1 . . . fn: that instant case has the feature, that cited case also has the 
feature, and that the feature is relevant to legal category A.  
If we are considering the case State v. Biker (cited case) while 
analyzing State v. Boostrider (instant case),199 we might construct this 
simplified argument. 
 
ARGUMENT BY LEGAL ANALOGY: BIKER & BOOSTRIDER 
Major Premise:  Biker and Boostrider are relevantly similar in that 
both interpreted Springer statute section 15.15, 
and in both, the machine had a motor and the 
machine had wheels; and the presence of a motor 
and wheels is relevant to whether the machine is 
a vehicle.  
Minor Premise:  The machine in Biker was a vehicle. 
Conclusion:  The machine in Boostrider is a vehicle. 
 
But further inquiry might defeat this argument. Like most 
argumentation schemes, the argument from legal analogy has its critical 
questions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 199. See supra text accompanying notes 38–41. 
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CRITICAL QUESTIONS: ARGUMENT BY LEGAL ANALOGY 
CQ1 Acceptable Scheme Question: Do the circumstances of this 
argument permit application of legal analogy from a cited case?  
CQ2 Similarity Question: With regard to each feature f1 . . . fn, is the 
feature present both in the cited case and the instant case?  
CQ3 Relevance Question: On what basis are features f1 . . . fn, relevant 
to legal category A?  
CQ4 Precedent Outcome Question: Did cited case really assign legal 
category A?  
CQ5 Relevant Dissimilarity Question: Are there dissimilarities g1 . . . 
gn between the cited case and instant case that are relevant to legal 
category A? (These may be differences in facts or in the law that 
was applied.) 
CQ6 Inconsistent Precedent Question: Is there some other case that is 
also similar to instant case in that both have features f1 . . . fn, 
except that legal category A is not applied in that case? 
CQ7 Binding Precedent Question: To what extent is the cited case 
binding on the court in the instant case? 
CQ8 Precedent Quality Question: Was the cited case wrongly decided? 
 
Here as in the legal deduction scheme, CQ1 asks the threshold question 
for every argumentation scheme: Is it appropriate here? In theory, there 
may be some circumstances where appeal to a cited case is not tolerated, 
but it is difficult to identify common examples, even when one is 
attempting to interpret statutory language according to its plain 
meaning.200 Also as usual, CQ2–CQ4 test the accuracy of the premises. 
CQ2’s reference to similarities between the cases refers both to factual 
similarities (like whether the machine had a motor) and similarities in 
terms of the body of law that each was applying. CQ3 considers whether 
the similar features between the cases are relevant to the present body of 
law. This question, taken up in more detail below, is important whenever 
 
 200. Note, however, that at least in European civil law, the use of analogy is prohibited in certain 
contexts. Harm Kloosterhuis, Analogy Argumentation in Law: A Dialectical Perspective, 8 ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE & L. 173, 182 (2000) (“Legal theory, as a rule, claims that the area of law to which the 
legal standard belongs, determines the possibilities of using that standard analogically . . . . The most 
telling example of this rule is the ban on analogy in criminal law: ‘stretching penalization’ on the basis of 
analogy argumentation is contrary to the very nature of criminal law. Tax law is yet another area of law 
that limits the possibilities to apply legal rules analogically [where it is] admissible only if advantageous 
to the taxpayer . . . . [C]ivil law too limits the possibilities of applying analogy argumentation to legal 
rules.”). 
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a case-to-case comparison is made. Generally, the arguer should be able 
to articulate the policy considerations that make the features relevant. 
CQ4 merely tests whether the proponent of the argument has correctly 
stated the outcome of the cited case.  
CQ5 and CQ6 invite new information that might undermine or defeat 
the argument. CQ5 looks at dissimilarities between the cited case and 
instant case. These may be factual: for example, the machine in Biker was 
much heavier than the machine in Boostrider, and the weight of the 
machine is probably relevant to its ability to injure people and damage 
property. The differences may also relate to the body of law: it is possible, 
in our example, the argument’s proponent might want to use the meaning 
a court gave to “vehicle” under a statute different than Springer statutes 
section 15.15, perhaps the motor-vehicle registration statute. The 
opponent might argue that the purposes of a vehicle registration statute—
to collect revenue to fund road construction and maintenance—and of 
section 15.15—to prevent harm to persons and park property—make it 
appropriate to use different definitions of “vehicle.” CQ6 is related to 
CQ3 because if the answer to this question is “yes,” it casts the relevance 
of features f1 . . . fn into doubt; if they can be present both when legal 
category A is assigned and when it is not, it is not clear that they are 
relevant to assigning the category. 
Finally, CQ7 and CQ8 situate the cited case and its value within the 
legal system. If the answer to CQ7 is that the cited case is binding 
precedent, that is, the cited case comes from a higher court in the same 
court hierarchy and constrains the action of the court in the instant case, 
then the answer to CQ8 may be irrelevant.201 If the answer to CQ7 is “no,” 
then an opponent of the argument has the option to try to dispose of the 
analogy by challenging the quality of the decision in the cited case. 
As noted above, it is most productive to see the argumentation scheme 
as a presumptively acceptable argument, unless it is challenged with the 
critical questions. The proponent should assert, or at least imply 
(remember the discussion of the enthymeme above),202 each of the 
premises in the form before the burden shifts to the opponent. Once she 
has done so, however, the critical questions provide an exhaustive list of 
avenues for attacking the argument. 
Of course, paired with the argumentation scheme for legal analogy 
should be one for legal (dis)analogy. 
 
 201. Of course, it may still be relevant to a party who plans to seek appellate review in hopes of 
overturning or distinguishing the precedent. Everything is arguable in the law, and arguing that a binding 
precedent reached an incorrect decision is something that both lawyers and judges do, whether or not they 
choose to follow or distinguish the precedent. 
 202. See supra text accompanying notes 126–129. 
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B. Legal D (dis)analogy Argumentation Scheme 
Here is the argumentation scheme for legal (dis)analogy: 
 
ARGUMENTATION SCHEME: ARGUMENT BY LEGAL (DIS)ANALOGY 
Major Premise:  Features f1 . . . fn are relevant to legal category A.  
Minor Premise:  Cited case and instant case are different in that 
cited case has features f1 . . . fn, and instant case 
does not have features f1 . . . fn.  
Conclusion:  Cited case should not be used as a basis for 
applying legal category A to instant case. 
 
If we are considering the case State v. Biker (cited case) while 
analyzing State v. Boostrider (instant case),203 we might construct this 
simplified argument. 
 
ARGUMENT BY LEGAL (DIS)ANALOGY: BIKER & BOOSTRIDER 
Major Premise:  The extent to which the weight of a machine is 
great enough to damage park grounds is relevant 
to whether the machine is a vehicle.  
Minor Premise:  Biker and Boostrider are dissimilar in that the 
machine in Biker (motorcycle) was heavy enough 
to damage park grounds but the machine in 
Boostrider (Boosted Board) was not heavy 
enough to damage park grounds. 
Conclusion:  Biker should not be used in Boostrider as a basis 
to conclude the Boosted Board is a vehicle. 
 
We must consider again the critical questions. In effect, this 
argumentation scheme is agnostic about the outcome of the cited case. If 
the two cases are relevantly dissimilar with regard to category A, there is 
no need to consider the outcome of the cited case. Instead, the major 
premise here takes the form of an assertion of relevance of the features, 
and the minor premise asserts that these features are present in one case 
and not the other. Note that despite the framing of the scheme, either the 
cited case or instant case may lack particular features; the cited case could 
have NOT HEAVY, and the instant case’s failure to have that feature means 
that it has HEAVY. 
 
 203. See supra text accompanying notes 38–41. 
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CRITICAL QUESTIONS: ARGUMENT BY LEGAL (DIS)ANALOGY 
CQ1 Acceptable Scheme Question: Do the circumstances of this 
argument permit application of a cited case?  
CQ2 Relevance Question: On what basis are features f1 . . . fn, relevant 
to legal category A?  
CQ3 Similarity Question: With regard to each feature f1 . . . fn, is the 
feature present in the cited case and absent in the instant case?  
CQ4 Inconsistent Precedent Question: Is there some other case that is 
also dissimilar to instant case in that it has features f1 . . . fn, except 
that legal category A was applied in that case? 
CQ5 Binding Precedent Question: To what extent is the cited case 
binding on the court in the instant case? 
CQ6 Precedent Quality Question: Was the cited case wrongly decided? 
 
Because the role of this argumentation scheme is to exclude 
consideration of the cited case in assessing legal category A, the 
information in the argumentation scheme and in the critical questions is 
considerably reduced from the legal analogy argumentation scheme. Like 
all schemes, CQ1 addresses the question of whether the scheme is 
appropriate. Generally, the answer will be “yes” in any context where the 
legal analogy argumentation scheme is appropriate. CQ2–CQ3 ask 
whether the premises are true. CQ4–CQ6 ask the same questions that the 
analogous questions in the legal analogy argumentation scheme do. 
As we can see from both the legal (dis)analogy schemes, what counts 
as a relevant (dis)similarity is perhaps the central question this article 
places in issue, a question the next section takes up. 
C. Relevant (Dis)Similarity in Depth 
An important theoretical concern about the account of legal analogy 
given in this article is the question of relevant similarity. As noted above, 
some theorists have challenged legal analogy as lacking rational force 
because it is impossible to say with certainty which (dis)similarities are 
44
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relevant and which are not.204 Others have argued that by identifying 
principles under which two cases are (dis)similar, an argument’s 
proponent is simply identifying a legal rule, for example, “a machine with 
a motor is a vehicle because a motor means the machine can move faster, 
raising the risk of injury to pedestrians” or “a very light machine is not a 
vehicle because it is not nearly as likely to injure pedestrians and damage 
park property as a car or motorcycle.” The critics say that if there is no 
legal rule, then the argument has no rational force, and if there is a legal 
rule, it is merely deductively applied and there is no legal analogy. 
But in applying Biker and Cyclist in the Boostrider case, the court may 
see the cited cases as embodying competing principles that lie behind the 
rule in section 15.15. “Every rule has a background justification—
sometimes called a rationale—which is the goal that the rule is designed 
to serve.”205 In the case of section 15.15, the justification could plausibly 
be stated as “avoiding injury to pedestrians and damage to park 
property.”206 Another general principle might be “users of the park should 
be able to get around by the means they choose unless some rule or 
principle provides otherwise.” Neither of these is a rule in the sense used 
by legal theorists because they are not sufficiently definite. They lack the 
definiteness of rules because “people understand that the background 
justifications themselves are often too vague to be helpful, too fuzzy to 
give people the kind of guidance they expect from the law, and too subject 
to manipulation and varying interpretation to constrain the actions of 
those who exercise power.”207  
So, for example, if the statute read “anyone who does anything in the 
municipal park that risks injury to pedestrians or damage to park property 
is guilty of a gross misdemeanor,” its application could scoop up a wide 
 
 204. See supra notes 104 and 148–149 and their accompanying text. See generally supra Part I. Not 
just the relevance of similarities, but the quantity of them, factors into some conceptions of analogy. See 
Lilian Bermejo-Luque, Deduction Without Dogmas: The Case of Moral Analogical Argumentation, 34 
INFORMAL LOGIC 311, 313–15 (comparing characterizations of analogy based on quantitative assessment 
of similarities–called there “a posteriori” analogies–with characterizations of analogy based on similarities 
that consider “both analogs . . . members of a category that is settled, a ‘new’ category for which the very 
analogy stands . . . [that] may be difficult or just impossible to specify in so many words without losing 
part of the analogy’s insight.”). 
 205. Schauer, THINKING, supra note 7, at 15. 
 206. Note that the approach described here could certainly be subject to criticism from advocates 
of the movement described as “new textualism.” See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New 
Textualism & Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (2013) (reviewing Antonin Scalia & Bryan 
A. Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2013)). I hoped to curb that criticism 
in part by making the hypothetical’s purpose part of its enactment. In any case, the new textualists may 
be right; and then again, they may not. Id. at 533–34. The job of the middle-level theory in this article is 
not, however, to choose winners in debates about high theory. Rather, it is to impose normative constraints 
on practitioners, some of whom may have one high theory, others another, but many of whom have only 
their argumentative folkways. 
 207. Schauer, THINKING, supra note 7, at 16.  
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variety of activities. Practically, the risk of overreach and inconsistent 
application by law enforcement would rise, and the courts would spend 
much more time determining whether particular instances of behavior 
were in or out of the rule. By enacting section 15.15 as they did, legislators 
chose to govern only one potentially dangerous or damaging activity.  
Thus, I contend that frequent need to balance justifications and the 
practical utility of legal analogy dispose of this complaint; or should at 
least cause us to take it with a grain of salt in practical contexts.  
But at least two other complaints are very important. The first 
complaint: why do proponents and opponents of legal analogies fail to 
identify the bases upon which the (dis)similarities are relevant? Because 
the relevance of the (dis)similarities in a legal analogy is critical to its 
work, it seems essential to making the basic argument. Leaving it out is 
tantamount to leaving out the minor premise (that the cited case was 
decided in a certain way) or failing to mention what the (dis)similarities 
are. Nevertheless, it seems lawyers and judges routinely do so.208 The 
second complaint: when argument proponents do identify those bases, 
what criteria should we use to evaluate them? Every conception of legal 
analogy discussed above, and in particular the argumentation schemes for 
it, make reference—either admiringly or grudgingly—to the relevance of 
(dis)similarities. The argumentation schemes must account for it, and so, 
presumably, must arguments by legal analogy. I can provide at most a 
schematic answer here to develop both theoretically and empirically in 
future.  
As to the first complaint—the absence of an assertion of relevance of 
(dis)similarities, at least two approaches present themselves: Note first 
that we can interpret arguments by legal analogy that do not express the 
relevance part of the major premise as enthymematic. Remember that we 
use the concept of enthymeme to reconstruct omitted premises from 
argument forms.209 Weinreb supports this view: the basis for relevance 
“is obvious or taken for granted and need not be stated expressly; but 
some such indication must be contained in or implied by a declaration that 
two things are similar, to establish the relevance of the particular 
similarities (and irrelevance of the dissimilarities) at stake.”210 So on this 
view, an argument that asserts the cited case and instant case share—or 
diverge on—some characteristics is implying that those characteristics are 
relevant to the legal category. Even if we accept that relevance is implied, 
we are left with one of two responses. 
On the one hand, we may take the normative stance that an argument 
 
 208. Consider the example in the next section, which is derived from the empirical study described 
below. See infra text accompanying notes 256–257. 
 209. See supra text accompanying notes 126–128. 
 210. Weinreb, supra note 3, at 78. 
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by analogy is defective in the absence of an explicit assertion of relevance. 
We might view this as an instance of a conventional rule in the legal 
community that a legal argument that does not fully state the premises and 
conclusions of its argumentation scheme is defective. One reason for this 
convention might be that a failure to state all the premises and conclusion 
places a higher burden on the opponent of the argument. Rather than just 
challenging an explicit principle that would make the (un)shared 
characteristics relevant, she must imagine and reconstruct all the possible 
principles the proponent of the argument could have adduced and respond 
to them or find another authority that declares a given characteristic 
irrelevant. If this is the norm, we should expect argument proponents to 
typically expressly state their bases for the relevance claim and judges 
and argument opponents to criticize them when they do not.  
On the other hand, we could react to the absence problem by removing 
the relevance element from the argumentation scheme. Argumentation 
schemes represent the forms of arguments warranted by their contexts of 
use, in this case, by the conventions of American courts and the 
community of American judges and lawyers. If argument proponents 
typically do not assert how the (dis)similarities in arguments are relevant 
to the legal category in question, then perhaps our system has effectively 
allocated the role of reconstructing that part of the major premise to the 
argument’s opponent; the critical question regarding the relevance of the 
(dis)similar features would remain, but instead of testing one of the 
premises in the argumentation scheme, it would invite new information, 
in the form of an argument for or against relevance. Whether this is the 
correct course probably also depends on whether judges and argument 
opponents criticize argument proponents for the omission—the same 
empirical question mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
What is conventional in American law, and therefore, which of these 
approaches is appropriate, thus depends on what lawyers and judges do—
an empirical question. This article provides the basis and direction for the 
research necessary to answer that question.211 
The second complaint was a lack of evaluative criteria for claims about 
the relevance of (dis)similarities between cases, whether those claims are 
made as part of the argumentation scheme, the critical questions, or both. 
This is in a sense to open a whole new avenue of inquiry. Because an 
assertion that (dis)similarities are relevant can be justified only by another 
argument, the acceptable form(s) of such arguments is an empirical and 
normative question: empirical in that what is acceptable in the American 
legal community requires study of what is accepted there, and normative 
in that it affects how we judge (and teach) the work of legal analogy. 
 
 211. See infra note 256 (describing a current effort to study this empirical question). 
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Given that we will have to postpone the empirical inquiry, at least for 
now,212 the following paragraphs can provide the first important steps for 
a normative framework for arguing about the relevance of 
(dis)similarities.  
First, an argument about relevance is simplified by “the extent to which 
a previous case, especially a controlling one, has announced which 
similarities are relevant and which are not.”213 Such an announcement can 
be express or implied. For example, the court in Biker could expressly 
have announced that “whether a machine has a motor is relevant to 
determining whether it is a vehicle.” Instead, it strongly implied that when 
it noted that the motorcycle had an engine and that the bicycle did not. 
The wise proponent of an argument by legal analogy (whether she states 
the basis for the relevance of (dis)similarities or not) will be prepared to 
offer more in response to this question: why is it relevant whether the 
machine has a motor? She will likely argue that it is relevant “on the basis 
of policy, principle, or something else.”214 The argument might take this 
form:  
 
1. Motors tend to be heavy and make a vehicle capable of greater 
speeds.  
 
2. Greater weight and speed increases the probability of injury to 
pedestrians and damage to the park. 
 
3. Protecting pedestrians and park property is identified as a goal 
of the statute in its preamble.  
 
4. Consequently, whether a machine has a motor is relevant to the 
determination whether it is a vehicle for purposes of the statute. 
 
Of course, the court in Biker or Cyclist could have expressed this 
argument. But in its absence, the legal analyst must still be prepared to 
assess the relevance of motors.  
The identification of rationales of this type requires invention or 
discovery. Different lawyers may identify different bases for relevance of 
(dis)similarities. This argument for relevance of motors is one that the 
defense in Boostrider might identify; it permits Ms. Boostrider to argue 
that despite the motor on her Boosted Board, it does not go as fast as 
bicycles (not vehicles) and is not nearly so heavy as a motorcycle or car. 
The prosecutor might offer a different justification for relevance, better 
 
 212. See infra note 256. 
 213. Schauer, THINKING, supra note 7, at 95. 
 214. Schauer, THINKING, supra note 7, at 98.  
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suited to her case. Either lawyer would be unwise not to consider other 
possible characterizations. 
The mere mention of a fact by a court in its analysis may be a basis for 
concluding that the fact is relevant to the legal category—so with the 
motor issue discussed here. We might conclude that the opinion is 
enthymematic in just the same way we suggested above.215 But what if 
the court mentions a fact in its description of the facts of the case but does 
not mention it again during its analysis? Given that the judge in a case 
might have great compendia of facts from which to characterize the case, 
the mere mention of a fact anywhere in the opinion might be enough to 
start an argument about its relevance.216 But then the argument about 
relevance may have to appeal to other cases and extrinsic evidence about 
what policies or principles apply. 
“Relevance is . . . a function of . . . contextual constraints put on 
language uses . . . made explicit by means of legal arguments: the 
argument from intention . . . from purpose . . . from legal history, and the 
various sorts of systemic argument used in legal practice.”217 Legal 
expertise, then, arises as one develops a mature sense of what types of 
arguments about relevance are acceptable in the community of lawyers. 
For purposes of a theory of relevant (dis)similarity, the framework should 
develop after an empirical assessment of what is acceptable.218 
D. The Argumentation Schemes Applied to a Legal Argument 
For the argumentation schemes to be useful, we must be able to apply 
them to the argumentative practices of lawyers and judges, and that 
application should provide insights for producing and evaluating 
arguments of the kinds we analyze. This section provides an example 
 
 215. See supra text accompanying note 209. 
 216. As Weinreb notes: 
 
Only a small number of the details of the situation out of which the controversy arises 
will affect the outcome; but all the details are potentially available for consideration, 
because it is that specific situation and no other that needs to be resolved. The lawyers’ 
arguments and the judge’s opinion recite only those facts that they respectively believe 
are material to the outcome. Although there are likely to be facts the relevance of 
which is disputed, there are a great many others the relevance or, more likely, the 
irrelevance of which is not in doubt. 
 
Weinreb, supra note 3, at 50 (emphasis added). Whether an arguer can distinguish the instant case from 
the cited case by reference to lawyers’ briefs filed in the cited case, which are widely available online 
now, is another matter, which will have to keep until another time. 
 217. Damiano Canale & Giovanni Tuzet, Analogy and Interpretation in Legal Argumentation, 
SYSTEMATIC APPROACHES TO ARGUMENT BY ANALOGY 227, 238 (H. J. Ribeiro ed., 2014). 
 218. See infra text accompanying notes 256–257. 
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drawn from the United States District Court, Southern District of New 
York, adjudicating the issue of fair use in a copyright infringement case. 
The example worked here provides evidence of the argumentation 
schemes and critical questions described above, suggesting that the 
argumentation schemes are a useful tool to analyze and produce such 
arguments. It also shows lawyers engaging in an argumentative 
practice—the use of straw-man arguments—that judges and law teachers 
may wish to discourage. 
Federal law provides copyright owners the exclusive right to make 
copies and derivative works of copyright-protected works.219 A rights 
holder can be either a plaintiff or defendant in a copyright infringement 
case, as a secondary user can bring an action for declaratory judgment on 
infringement.220 A secondary user may assert the affirmative defense of 
fair use, which is a bar to the rights holder’s recovery for infringement, 
and courts assess the defense using a four-factor test.221 The first factor is 
“the purpose and character of the [secondary] use.”222 One issue in 
assessing this factor is whether the secondary use is transformative—that 
is, “whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original 
creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or 
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning or 
message.”223 
The opinion of Judge Cote in Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. 
Holdings, Inc.,224 resulted from the parties’ cross motions for summary 
judgment, which had in turn precipitated six briefs: defendant’s 
memorandum in support of its motion (“defendant’s motion”), plaintiff’s 
opposition to it, defendant’s reply to plaintiff’s opposition, plaintiff’s 
motion (“plaintiff’s motion”), defendant’s opposition to it, and plaintiff’s 
reply to defendant’s opposition.225 The Associated Press (AP)—a 
cooperative enterprise owned by 1,400 U.S. newspapers that produced 
 
 219. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018). 
 220. 22 U.S.C. § 2201(a). See, e.g., Adjmi v. DLT Ent. Ltd., 97 F. Supp. 3d 512, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015). 
 221. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). The statute requires that “the factors to be considered shall include” 
the four named factors, but it does not preclude courts considering other factors. Id. 
 222. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). 
 223. Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 224. 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 225. Mem. of Law of Pl. the Assoc. Press in Supp. of its Mot. for Sum. J. on its Copyright 
Infringement Claim, ECF No. 54 (Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Pl.’s Mot.]; Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.’ 
Mot. for Sum. J., ECF No. 56 (Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Defs.’ Mot.]; Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to 
Defs.’ Mot. for Sum. J., ECF No. 57 (Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n]; Defs.’ Mem. of Law in 
Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Sum. J., ECF No. 58 (Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Defs.’ Opp’n]; Pl.’s Reply Mem. 
of Law in Further Supp. of its Mot. for Sum. J. on its Copyright Infringement Claims, ECF No. 118 (Jan. 
23, 2013) [hereinafter Pl.’s Reply]; Reply Mem. of Law in Further Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Sum. J., ECF 
No. 123 (Jan. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Defs.’ Reply]. 
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between 1,000 and 2,000 news stories every day—was the rights holder 
and plaintiff in this case.226 AP typically constructed its stories so that the 
first part, or “lede,” contained the most critical information in the article, 
with the balance of the article elaborating on it.227 AP licensed its stories, 
each subject to copyright, to print newspapers but also for display on news 
websites that paid it a fee; AP licensed at least some of them to display 
the entire story on the internet to consumers who paid no fees to access 
them.228 AP had also licensed to “news clipping services” that permitted 
“the distribution of excerpts from or snippets of its articles” to businesses 
that wished to monitor mentions of them in the news.229  
Meltwater used “automated computer programs or algorithms to copy 
or ‘scrape’ an [AP] article from an online news source, index the article, 
and deliver verbatim excerpts of the article to its [paying] customers in 
response to search queries.”230 Meltwater’s customers could search for 
content, including AP stories, both by setting up a software “agent” to 
find and store excerpts of all applicable stories,231 and by performing “ad 
hoc” searches, the results of which Meltwater’s service did not save.232 
The record showed that Meltwater competed for—and sometimes won—
customers from AP and its news-clipping licensees.233  
Important in this context was the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Kelly v. 
Arriba Soft Corp.234 The Kelly court found that a free publicly available 
search engine’s use of “thumbnail” versions of photographs displayed 
elsewhere on the web was transformative and a fair use; the thumbnails 
were lower-resolution versions of the entire photos displayed 
elsewhere.235 Each party in its briefs, and the court in its opinion, cited 
Kelly in support of its argument about whether Meltwater’s secondary use 
of the works here was transformative.  
In its motion memo’s discussion of transformativeness, AP did not 
immediately raise Kelly, instead discussing other cases that it concluded 
were similar to Meltwater’s secondary use and that found those secondary 
uses not to be transformative.236 Anticipating Meltwater’s reliance on 
Kelly, however, AP devoted the next subsection of its argument to Kelly 
 
 226. 931 F. Supp. 2d at 541. 
 227. Id. at 541. 
 228. Id. at 542. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 543. 
 231. 931 F. Supp. 2d at 544. 
 232. Id. at 545. 
 233. Id. at 543. 
 234. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 235. Id. at 815. 
 236. Pl.’s Mot., supra note 225, at 10–15. 
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and related cases.237 Rather than merely distinguish those cases, AP 
constructed the argument it claimed Meltwater would make and then 
dissected it by application of the critical questions. AP asserted that 
Meltwater would argue its service: 
 
constitutes a transformative use because it offers access to a search 
engine that allows its customers to discover information in the news 
media relevant to their business and because many of its customers 
only look for mentions of their company or its press releases rather 
than the content of the news articles, an allegedly different purpose. 
Meltwater [will base] this argument on two Ninth Circuit cases, 
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) and Perfect 
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d t 146 (9th Cir. 2007), which held 
the search engines at issue in those cases to be transformative uses 
as electronic reference tools whose use of thumbnail images of 
photographs in search results served a different purpose than the 
original.238 
 
We can easily recast this in the legal analogy argumentation scheme.239 
 
ARGUMENT BY LEGAL ANALOGY: KELLY & ASSOCIATED PRESS 
Major Premise:  Kelly and the instant case are relevantly similar in 
that both interpreted fair use, and in both, the 
secondary use could function as a search engine.  
Minor Premise:  The secondary use in Kelly was transformative. 
Conclusion:  The secondary use in the instant case is 
transformative. 
 
The relevance of the similarity is implied enthymematically.  
AP’s critique of this argument focused on the last critical questions 
first, beginning with CQ 7 Binding Precedent Question. AP asserted that 
the “Second Circuit has never found a transformative use when the 
original work was not incorporated as raw material into a new work with 
a further expressive purpose or new expressive meaning. Nor has it found 
that merely making a work more accessible constitutes a transformative 
use sufficient to justify extensive verbatim use of it.”240 By reference to 
the Second Circuit, AP drew attention to the fact that Kelly—a Ninth 
 
 237. Id. at 15–20. 
 238. Id. at 15–16 (internal quotations and some internal citations omitted). Plaintiff’s motion 
actually asserted that Meltwater already had made this argument in a declaration. Id. at 15. 
 239. See generally supra Part III(A), for the argumentation scheme and critical questions. 
 240. Pl.’s Mot., supra note 225, at 16. 
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Circuit case—was not binding on the New York district court, and that no 
Second Circuit case had adopted Kelly’s holding. It answered CQ 7 in the 
negative. 
AP then answered both CQ 8 Precedent Quality Question and CQ 6 
Inconsistent Precedent Question by offering another argument by legal 
analogy to the Second Circuit case Infinity Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Kirkwood.241 We can reconstruct this argument using the argumentation 
scheme as well: 
 
ARGUMENT BY LEGAL ANALOGY: INFINITY & ASSOCIATED PRESS 
Major Premise:  Infinity and the instant case are relevantly similar 
in that both interpreted fair use, and in both, the 
secondary user provided “snippets” of the rights 
holder’s works, took rights holder’s unaltered 
works and marketed them to its customers, and 
claimed its use was of benefit to society.  
Minor Premise:  The secondary use in Infinity was not 
transformative. 
Conclusion:  The secondary use in the instant case is not 
transformative. 
 
Without explicitly saying Kelly was wrongly decided, AP presented an 
analogy that strongly suggested it was, answering CQ 8 in the affirmative. 
It also answered CQ 6 in the affirmative by locating a presumptively valid 
legal analogy for the instant case that came out against a finding of 
transformativeness. 
Finally, AP embarked on a lengthy attack based on CQ 2 Similarity 
Question, arguing that Meltwater’s service is not a search engine in the 
sense that the service in Kelly was.242 At the same time, it offered an 
affirmative response to CQ 5 Relevant Dissimilarity Question, arguing 
that Meltwater’s service replaced AP’s products, unlike the search engine 
in Kelly, and that Meltwater’s service was more commercial in that it 
charged for the search-engine function, while the defendant in Kelly did 
not.243 
So far, of course, we have considered only AP’s arguments, and its 
effort to anticipate Meltwater’s Kelly argument was a straw man if in fact 
Meltwater did not make that argument. 
In fact, Meltwater did use Kelly, but only as one among a larger number 
 
 241. 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998). See Pl.’s Mot., supra note 225, at 16–17. 
 242. Pl.’s Mot., supra note 225, at 18–19. 
 243. Id. at 18–20. 
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of cases, including cases from the Second and other circuits. One sentence 
and the string cite that follows it together make an interesting example: 
 
While some transformative uses may change the original work, that 
is not necessary, as a “transformative use can also be one that serves 
an entirely different purpose.” The Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 
No. 11-cv-6351(HB), 2012 WL 4808939, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 
2012) (full copies of books made by digital archive were 
transformative “because the copies serve an entirely different 
purpose than the original works”); accord Bill Graham, 448 F.3d at 
609 [(2d Cir. 2006)] (use is transformative where the defendant’s 
purpose in using images “is plainly different from the original 
purpose for which they were created”); Lennon v. Premise Media 
Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (defendants’ use 
“transformative because they put the song to a different purpose”); 
A. V. ex rel Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639 (4th 
Cir. 2009) (a use “can be transformative in function or purpose 
without altering or actually adding to the original work”).244 
 
Note that the string cite, taken together with facts about the present case 
provided in nearby paragraphs, provided at least two fully formed, though 
enthymematic, legal analogies. For both Author’s Guild and Lennon, 
Meltwater’s description of the cited cases’ facts and outcomes in the 
explanatory parentheticals implied that the instant case should come out 
the same way because of these similarities. We cannot quite be certain 
about Bill Graham, though, because of the use of the present tense in the 
parenthetical—“use is transformative.” We can read this in at least two 
ways: on the one hand, the Bill Graham court may have found the 
defendant’s use there was “plainly different” and therefore 
transformative. On the other hand, perhaps the court there adopted a rule 
to the effect that if a defendant’s purpose is plainly different, it is 
transformative; but in that case, we do not know whether the court found 
the defendant’s use was plainly different.245 A similar question arises with 
regard to Vanderhye’s “a use can be transformative”—was it in that case? 
Meltwater did not tell us.246 
Meltwater did not mention the Infinity case in its motion memo, a fact 
 
 244. Defs.’ Mot., supra note 225, at 9. 
 245. Of course, the reader can probably look up the cited case, but the argument’s author should 
not foist the work onto the reader. 
 246. Meltwater would have done better to follow the advice of the Bluebook and begun its 
parenthetical with a gerund, e.g., “finding a use transformative because the defendant’s purpose in using 
images was ‘plainly different from the original purpose for which they were created.’” See THE 
BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION, rule 1.5 (20th ed. 2015). 
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that AP addresses in it its opposition to Meltwater’s motion: “Meltwater’s 
failure to grapple with—or even acknowledge—the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Infinity is particularly egregious.”247 In the text that follows, 
we can perhaps read AP as claiming an argumentative victory in its 
application of the Infinity case as precedent, because Meltwater’s failure 
to challenge AP’s presumptively acceptable application of the 
argumentation scheme to Infinity means that the court should accept that 
argument. Of course, Meltwater would have been disinclined to mention 
a case that goes against it its own motion memo.  
AP’s opposition also went on to critique Meltwater’s use of Kelly, 
offering yet another answer to CQ 5 Relevant Dissimilarity Question, this 
time a more detailed statement of the difference between Meltwater’s use 
of AP’s stories and ArribaSoft’s use of Kelly’s photos: “use of thumbnail 
images of Kelly’s photographs was transformative only because the 
thumbnails were of such low resolution that they could not be used to 
fulfill an aesthetic purpose.”248 It contrasts the instant case, where it 
claimed Meltwater’s products superseded AP’s own. 
Meltwater propped up its use of Kelly and attacked AP’s use of Infinity 
in its opposition to AP’s motion. With regard to Kelly, Meltwater took the 
tack of reframing AP’s argument as a deductive one. Meltwater wrote: 
 
AP claims . . . only a use that adds new expression to the original 
work can be transformative . . . . To the contrary, the case law 
consistently recognizes that “making an exact copy of a work may 
be transformative so long as the copy serves a different function than 
the original work.” Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165. This understanding 
repeatedly has been applied in cases involving search engines. The 
Ninth Circuit in Kelly thus rejected the argument that “because 
Arriba reproduced [plaintiff’s] exact images and added nothing to 
them, Arriba’s use cannot be transformative” and found that 
Arriba’s thumbnails, although “exact replica[s],” were 
transformative because they “served an entirely different function 
than Kelly’s original images.” Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818-19.249 
 
Meltwater recast AP’s argument as a deductive argument in what I shall 
call “modus tollens” form, which it then refuted by use of a critical 
question.250 The deductive argument takes this form: 
 
 247. Pl.’s Opp’n, supra note 225, at 9. 
 248. Id. at 9. 
 249. Defs.’ Opp’n, supra note 225, at 3–4 (some citations omitted; emendations in original). 
 250. Modus tollens is a variant of the deductive syllogism under which the consequent of the major 
premise is false, compelling the conclusion that the antecedent must also be. Contrast this with the faulty 
deductive form in the example of denying the antecedent above. See supra text accompanying notes 69–
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ARGUMENT BY LEGAL DEDUCTION (“MODUS TOLLENS”): KELLY & 
ASSOCIATED PRESS 
Major Premise:  According to copyright case law (Kelly), if a 
secondary use is transformative, it must add new 
expression to the original work. 
Minor Premise:  Meltwater did not add new expression to AP’s 
stories. 
Conclusion:  Meltwater’s use of AP’s stories are not 
transformative. 
 
As we saw above, the modus ponens deductive argumentation scheme 
includes CQ 4 Rule Question, which asks whether the cited case actually 
states the rule that the argument proponent has offered as its major 
premise.251 Meltwater shows that the answer must be negative, as the 
Kelley court continued to conclude the secondary use there was 
transformative despite the fact that it included “exact replicas” of the 
rights holder’s works. It remains unclear, however, whether AP made its 
argument in such a categorical form; in other words, it appears likely that 
Meltwater constructed and tore down its own straw man here. 
Meltwater also used a critical question from the legal analogy 
argumentation scheme (about relevant differences) to distinguish Infinity, 
asserting simply that the earlier case “did not involve an Internet search 
engine, or a service analogous to one.”252  
Both parties continued their efforts in their reply briefs,253 but perhaps 
this is sufficient analysis to offer two observations. First, the arguments 
of these two parties show the structures of the legal analogy 
(dis)argumentation schemes and their critical questions. The parties are 
generally explicit in asserting the premises necessary to fill the 
argumentation scheme, with the exception that the relevance of the 
(dis)similarities must be inferred, and at least one conclusion is omitted 
enthymematically but clearly implied. The argumentation schemes (or 
something like them) would have been a useful way to come up with the 
arguments that the attorneys actually used. 
The second observation here is of a bit more concern. Each party 
constructed in its own brief at least one straw-man argument, where it 
used an argumentation scheme to impute an argument to the other side—
 
72. As with my use of “modus ponens” there, I take some technical liberty by applying “modus tollens” 
as the name of a sentential logical form. 
 251. See supra text accompanying notes 190–192. 
 252. Defs.’ Opp’n, supra note 225, at 7. 
 253. See generally Pl.’s Reply, supra note 225; Defs.’ Reply, supra note 225. 
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an argument the author of the brief knew to be unacceptable—in order to 
demolish it using critical questions. In each case, the argument the brief’s 
author imputed to its opponent was a highly reduced form of the argument 
the opponent made or was likely to make. This kind of argumentative 
practice forces the other side to reframe or rebut arguments that it has not 
actually made; and it forces the reader—the judge and her clerks—to 
engage in comparative reading of the briefs to test whether the authors of 
briefs say what their opponents say they said. This raises questions of 
fairness and efficiency in legal arguments. 
If empirical study shows these straw-man practices are commonplace, 
they may be acceptable, at least on some level, to legal practitioners. 
Given the inefficiencies they engender, however, judges and law teachers 
may seek to reframe conventional attitudes by pointing out these practices 
and criticizing them. 
CONCLUSION 
This article argues that current theories of legal analogy are too deeply 
grounded in deduction as the sine qua non of all types of good legal 
arguments. As a result, they leave too much reasonable and rational legal 
argumentation unexplained and undisciplined. Informal logic and 
argumentation schemes offer a means of providing and assessing the 
rational discipline that legal analogy should exhibit. 
This article provides a solid foundation for future research into 
argumentation schemes generally and the legal (dis)analogy 
argumentation schemes specifically by demonstrating the reasonableness 
of arguing by legal analogy. Broader study is required to develop 
argumentation schemes for other types of informal legal argument. This 
article has provided two—for legal analogy and legal (dis)analogy—and 
has tentatively offered one for legal deduction. Professor Walton and his 
colleagues have described a great many more argumentation schemes,254 
and many of them may be adapted to legal argumentation. Others do not 
exist in the argumentation-scheme literature but may nonetheless be 
useful for legal practice. For example, some lawyers do make use of 
covering rules when arguing with legal analogies.255 An argumentation 
scheme that warrants the adoption of such a rule as part of a legal 
deduction would prove valuable. 
But before work to broaden use of argumentation schemes and 
informal logic in the law is undertaken, deeper theoretical study is 
required to ground the argumentation schemes given in this article and 
 
 254. See generally Walton et al., supra note 11. 
 255. See supra note 83. 
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argumentation schemes generally in theories of legal argumentation and 
reasoning broadly accepted in the courtroom and legal academy.  
Deeper study in another direction is required to ascertain what the 
conventions of the legal community actually are relating to the 
argumentation schemes presented in this article.256 As Schauer and 
Spellman note: “it remains to be seen just how often genuinely analogical 
reasoning takes place in legal argument and judicial decisions. That 
inquiry is of necessity empirical.”257 Such studies should provide 
evidence about whether the argumentation schemes are valid and provide 
reliable descriptions of legal professionals’ argumentation. They will 
serve a quasi-normative function, because an empirical description of 
what practitioners find acceptable functions as description of their norms. 
This does not mean, however, that judges, scholars, and teachers of law 
cannot advocate for norms that do a better job living up to standards of 
ethics and efficiency. For example, if straw-man arguments of the kind 
discussed in Part III(D) are typical, judges and scholars may call out 
practitioners who engage in them to curb the practice. 
One important question is whether judges and lawyers tend, as Weinreb 
claims, not to use covering rules when arguing with the use of cases.258 
Central to his claims and those of this article is the assertion that logical 
deduction is not necessary to draw a legal analogy from a cited case to an 
instant case. The skeptics discussed above assert that legal analogy, to 
have rational force, must include a deductively applied rule that brings 
the cited case and instant case under a single “covering rule.”259 So far, 
no empirical study has confirmed Weinreb’s assertion and this article’s 
intuition that judges and lawyers frequently use legal analogy without 
covering rules.260 
This study of the argumentation schemes in law should be dialogical: 
empirical work will support inductive generalizations about what lawyers 
and judges do, and those generalizations may warrant changes to the 
argumentation schemes presented here. At the same time, principles of 
reasonableness and rationality—which lie at the heart of argumentation-
schematic thinking—are inconsistent with practices such as straw-man 
arguments, for which there may be widespread empirical evidence. That 
 
 256. See supra Part III(C) for a discussion of empirical questions related to the argumentation 
schemes and particularly in the context of relevant (dis)similarities. I am currently performing an 
empirical study that examines some 200 lawyers’ briefs and court opinions in a random selection of federal 
copyright cases from the last several years. My team is coding and analyzing the argumentative uses of 
cited cases in those artifacts in an effort to characterize the relative frequency and characteristics of 
arguments by legal analogy. 
 257. Schauer & Spellman, supra note 3, at 268. 
 258. See supra note 82. 
 259. See supra Part I(C)(1). 
 260. See supra note 82. 
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may be grounds for arguing for changes in how lawyers argue. 
I acknowledge that nothing said in this article, and nothing that comes 
from the proposed empirical work, will be demonstrated deductively. But 
I hope I have persuaded the reader that nothing interesting about the law 
ever is. 
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